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THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME: REALIZING THE
VISION OF COMMUNITY-BASED MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT FOR CHILDREN
Yael Zakai Cannon*
The burden of suffering experienced by children with mental
health needs and their families has created a health crisis in this
country. Growing numbers of children are suffering needlessly be-
cause their emotional, behavioral, and developmental needs are not
being met by those very institutions which were explicitly created to
take care of them .
There is broad evidence that the nation lacks a unified infrastruc-
ture to help these children, many of whom are falling through the
cracks. Too often, children who are not identified as having mental
health problems and who do not receive services end up in jail.
Children and families are suffering because of missed opportunities
for prevention and early identification, fragmented treatment ser-
vices, and low priorities for resources.'
INTRODUCTION
Mary,2 a sixteen-year-old girl from Washington, D.C., looked out
the window of the van that was taking her across state lines and
through the countryside to a residential treatment center, a secure fa-
cility for youth with serious behavioral, emotional, or mental health
problems.3 School was incredibly frustrating for her. According to
her doctors, learning was challenging for her because she was born
addicted to crack cocaine. Her teachers knew that she had learning
* The author is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of New Mexico School of
Law, and began work on this Article as a Practitioner-in-Residence and Acting Director of the
Disability Rights Law Clinic at the Washington College of Law at American University. The
author would like to express her gratitude for the invaluable feedback of Robert D. Dinerstein,
Susan Bennett, Ann Shalleck, Rangeley Wallace, Lindsay Wiley, Binny Miller, and other col-
leagues from the Washington College of Law, and the excellent research assistance of Jamie
Sparano, Janyll Canals, Josh Young, and Katherine Aljinovic.
1. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., REPORT OF THE
SURGEON GENERAL'S CONFERENCE ON CHILDREN's MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION
AGENDA 1, 11 (2000) [hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA].
2. Mary's story is based on a composite of several clients with whom the author worked in her
legal practice.
3. Christine F. Vaughn, Residential Treatment Centers: Not a Solution for Children with Mental
Health Needs, 39 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. J. POVERTY L. & POL'Y 274, 274 (2005).
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disabilities, but she was not receiving all of the special education ser-
vices she required. She would sit in class and think about how angry
she was at her birth mother for abandoning her in the hospital. She
would fight with her classmates, which frequently resulted in her sus-
pension from school. She had been arrested for one of her bigger
fights and spent a few months sitting in an overcrowded juvenile hall.
School was not the only difficult place for her. After a stranger
raped her a few years earlier in the alley behind her foster mother's
home, she would lie awake at night fearing that she might be raped
again. Mary told her foster mother and her pediatrician about the
rape, and the pediatrician referred her for counseling to the city
mental health agency, which would connect her with a provider that
accepted her Medicaid health insurance. However, the agency said it
would be several months before Mary could be squeezed in for an
intake appointment and advised her to talk to her probation officer
about obtaining counseling services. The probation officer told Mary
and her foster mother to ask her child welfare agency social worker to
help them identify a counseling provider, and her child welfare social
worker told them that Mary's school was supposed to be providing her
with counseling. However, her school had not included counseling
services as part of her special education program. In the end, she
went without counseling. Frustrated with Mary's behavior and
ashamed about talk in the neighborhood that Mary was "crazy," her
foster mother grounded her in the hope that Mary would "snap out of
it."
Mary's fear and lack of sleep kept her on edge and defensive much
of the time. She tried to end her life by swallowing a bottle of her
foster mother's blood pressure pills and landed in a psychiatric hospi-
tal, only to leave a few weeks later with diagnoses for several mental
health disorders but without any services. Mary continued to fail in
school. At a meeting of Mary's special education team, school offi-
cials decided to send Mary to a residential treatment center. They
explained to Mary's foster mother that a residential treatment facility
is an institution that typically provides children with emotional and
behavioral problems with constant supervision and care through a
longer term program than a psychiatric hospital could offer.4 The first
4. Glossary of Terms Used in Children's and Adolescents' Mental Health, SUBSTANCE ABUSE
& MENTAL HEALTH SERvs. ADMIN., http://crextras.com/lib/articles/therapy/types/glossary-
children/2/#toc-d-s (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). There is no agreed-upon, standardized definition
for residential treatment centers (RTCs), sometimes referred to as residential treatment facilities
(RTCs). The American Association of Children's Residential Centers defines an RTC as "an
organization whose primary purpose is the provision of individually planned programs of mental
health treatment, other than acute inpatient care, in conjunction with residential care for seri-
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available bed was located at a facility hundreds of miles from her com-
munity, in a rural area several states away.
While at the facility, Mary was isolated in a small room when staff
viewed her as insubordinate, and the many hours she spent in isola-
tion only made her more anxious. She was far from home, making it
difficult for her foster mother to be involved in her treatment and for
the state education agency that placed her and funded her stay at the
facility to monitor her treatment, safety, and health. Her stay at the
facility lasted more than a year. At the time of Mary's discharge,
there was no plan in place for her to receive mental health treatment
upon her return home. When she returned, she again found herself
without the necessary community-based mental health services and
struggled with transferring any positive treatment effects she might
have experienced in the highly structured, rural facility to her hectic,
unstructured, and urban daily life. She fell back into the same behav-
ioral problems she experienced prior to her institutionalization and
recidivated, cycling yet again through the juvenile delinquency system.
There are a number of federal legal regimes5 explicitly structured to
ensure that children like Mary are provided with timely community-
ously emotionally disturbed children and youth, ages 17 and younger." Residential Treatment
Centers, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION (OJJDP), http://www.
ojjdp.gov/mpg/progTypesResidentialTreatment.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2012). A wide variety
of programs can fall into this category. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), RESI-
DENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS: CONCERNS REGARDING ABUSE AND DEATH IN CERTAIN
PROGRAMS FOR TROUBLED YOUTI 4-5 (2007) [hereinafter RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PRO-
GRAMS] (reporting that state officials identified 71 different types of residential treatment pro-
grams for youth with mental illness). Programs often claim to provide a range of services, either
on-site or through links with community programs, including educational, medical, psychiatric,
and clinical or mental health services. "The Juvenile Residential Facility Census, a biennial sur-
vey conducted by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP), found
that more than 900 facilities identified themselves as residential treatment centers," and many
also described themselves as detention centers, training schools, group homes, ranches or wilder-
ness camps, boot camps, diagnostic centers, or homeless or runaway shelters. Residential Treat-
ment Centers, supra. The number of residents held in facilities that self-identified as RTCs
varied, with most reporting that they currently hold eleven to fifty residents in their individual
facilities. Id. A subset of residential facilities qualifies as psychiatric residential treatment facili-
ties (PRTFs) under federal regulations. 42 C.F.R. § 483.352 (2010). The federal Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services note that PRTFs are for children who require more intensive
services and must be certified as PRTFs. Memorandum from Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid
Servs. to State Survey Agency Dirs. (Feb. 16, 2007), available at http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/SurveyCertificationGennfo/Downloads/SCLetter7-15.
pdf. This Article uses the broader term "RTCs" to include those facilities that qualify as certi-
fied PRTFs under the Medicaid regulations, but also the other types of facilities described in this
footnote.
5. The term "legal regime" is used to describe a variety of components that govern a particu-
lar system, such as statutes, regulations, and case law, as well as policies, guidance, and orders
from executive agencies.
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based mental health treatment. This Article argues that local and
state public agencies often fail to comply with their duties and fulfill
the aims of these federal regimes, leading to unnecessary institutional-
ization of youth. Mary's placement in a residential treatment facility
reflects a failure of the multiple systems in which she was involved to
achieve the goals of related federal legal regimes. Like Mary, a child
living in poverty may be entangled in the child welfare and juvenile
justice systems and may have unmet special education and health care
needs. Rather than coordinating to address a child's needs holisti-
cally, these systems typically operate as though they are in silos. For
example, officials from the child welfare agency responsible for a
child's foster care placement might never communicate with the
school officials responsible for the child's special education needs.
This can lead to failure and crisis in both the foster home and the
school, resulting in the child's placement in a more restrictive institu-
tional setting.
Just as public agencies often operate in silos, the examination of
problems affecting low-income youth also typically occurs through
singular, myopic lenses. Scholars often engage in an individual assess-
ment of challenges related to one system, such as the child welfare
system or the juvenile justice system.6 In addition, courts usually seg-
regate hearings related to children, with family court judges handling
an "abuse/neglect docket" and handling a "juvenile delinquency
docket" in different family court hearings and different administrative
hearing officers handling special education and Medicaid-related
claims in other fora. Moreover, attorneys are appointed by courts or
offer themselves for hire for a particular category of matters and typi-
cally remain in their own silos. 7 This Article expands the analysis of
6. This Article builds on the work of those scholars who analyze the intersections between two
different legal systems that affect children by examining connections among the multitude of
legal regimes that can have an impact on the lives of children living in poverty. See, e.g., Joseph
B. Tulman, Special Education Advocacy for Youth in the Delinquency System, in SPECIAL EDU-
CATION ADVOCACY 401 (Ruth Colker & Julie K. Waterstone eds., 2011) (examining intersec-
tions between the special education and juvenile delinquency systems).
7. For example, juvenile public defenders are explicitly appointed to defend a child client in
connection with a delinquency charge and are typically only provided with the resources and
armed with the expertise to focus on that particular problem. For the many children involved
with multiple systems, coordination and communication by a juvenile public defender with a
child's attorney or guardian ad litem in a dependency matter or counsel for the child's parent in a
special education matter rarely occurs. There are important merits in specialization by family
court judges and attorneys, as well as public agencies, which could cut against a more coordi-
nated model, such as the "one family, one judge" model sometimes used in the family court in
the District of Columbia's Superior Court. See D.C. CODE § 11-1104 (LexisNexis 2001 & repl.
vol. 2008) (providing for the consolidation, where practical and feasible, of cases involving the
same individual or family before one family court judge). Moreover, attorneys may strategically
1052 [Vol. 61:1049
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the legal systems affecting at-risk youth by looking at them holisti-
cally, analyzing their intersections, and evaluating the harmful effects
of the compartmentalization. As a result of this compartmentalization
and other factors, the common goals of federal legal regimes related
to child welfare, special education, health care, juvenile justice, and
disability rights continue to go unrealized, resulting in the denial to
children of much-needed treatment and educational services and their
subsequent placement in restrictive settings.
Part II examines the over-institutionalization of children in harmful
and costly residential treatment centers (RTCs), a largely invisible
problem about which policymakers, judges, attorneys, and taxpayers
should all be concerned." Part III reviews the various legal regimes
structured to ensure that children with mental health needs receive
community-based services and remain out of these institutions.9
Through their statutes, regulations, case law, and policies, federal le-
gal regimes related to child welfare, special education, health care, ju-
venile justice, and disability rights share these common aims, which
remain unrealized. Part IV assesses the reasons for the disjunction
between the shared goals of these legal regimes and the reality that
many children living in poverty are unnecessarily institutionalized due
to their inability to access community-based services.10 The stigma
surrounding mental illness, compartmentalization among child-serving
public agencies," and the scarcity of providers contribute collectively
to this disjunction, with devastating consequences.
In Part V, the Article concludes by calling for the fulfillment of the
goals of these legal regimes through the implementation of principles
and best practices in the field of children's mental health identified by
researchers in other disciplines, such as psychiatry, psychology, social
choose to avoid coordination because challenges can occur if sensitive information is shared
across systems. Despite these tensions, coordination among different stakeholders and actors in
a child's life can promote more positive outcomes in many cases, especially if the coordination
can occur before a child is entangled in the child welfare or juvenile justice systems. Even if a
child is already court-involved, a holistic approach to the child's needs can sometimes prove
beneficial. For example, the education of a juvenile court judge about a child's disability could
have a positive impact on the adjudication of a delinquency charge. Tulman, supra note 6, at
416-21.
8. See infra notes 15-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 59-299 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 300-39 and accompanying text.
11. See April Land, Dead to Rights: A Father's Struggle to Secure Mental Health Services for
His Son, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 279, 281 (2003) ("The agencies responsible for
administering federal law must not be permitted to continue to avoid compliance with clear
statutory mandates. They are failing to meet their legal responsibilities by asserting that services
should be provided by other agencies, rather than coordinating efforts with those other agencies
to ensure that children get services that are necessary and required by federal law.").
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work, and health policy.1 2 Public agencies should adopt and make op-
erational the "system of care" philosophy, an approach to children's
mental health developed by the National Institute of Mental Health
that emphasizes coordination among various child-serving public
agencies.' 3 Local and state agencies should also ensure the provision
of specific mental health services proven to be effective through valid
and robust scientific studies, known as "evidence-based practices,"14
to keep children at home and in their communities.
II. THE UNWARRANTED AND COSTLY INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF
CHILDREN IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACILITIES
"Mental health in childhood and adolescence is defined by the
achievement of expected developmental cognitive, social, and emo-
tional milestones and by secure attachments, satisfying social relation-
ships, and effective coping skills."' 5 However, mental health disorders
that at least minimally impair a child's functioning and quality of life
affect almost twenty-one percent of children aged nine to seventeen,16
and these disorders occur frequently among children living in pov-
erty,' 7 who are also most likely to have their mental health needs go
12. See infra notes 340-460 and accompanying text.
13. See JANICE L. COOPER ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR CHILDREN IN POVERTY, UNCLAIMED
CHILDREN REVISITED: THE STATUS OF CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 6 (2008), available at http://www.nccp.org/publications/pdf/text_853.pdf. The system of
care philosophy has been adopted in name by many states, but has not been made operational
through the development of policies or practices by most states. Id. When meaningfully imple-
mented, the approach reflects the intentions of federal legal regimes by emphasizing access to:
Comprehensive service array; Individualized services based on individualized needs
and service plans; Clinically-appropriate, least-restrictive service settings; Families as
full partners in service planning, decision-making, and delivery; Integrated service de-
livery; Case coordination and seamless service delivery; Early identification and inter-
vention; Seamless transitions to adulthood; Culturally responsive services and supports;
[and] Youth and family rights and advocacy.
Id. at 7.
14. Id. at 42; see also Edward J. Mullen, Facilitating Practitioner Use of Evidence-Based Prac-
tice, in DESK REFERENCE FOR EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE IN HEALTHCARE AND HUMAN SER-
VICES (A. R. Roberts & K. Yeager eds., 2004), available at www.columbia.edu/cu/musher/EBP%
200xford%20Press%20Chapter.doc.
15. OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL 123 (1999) [hereinafter MENTAL HEALTH: A
REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL).
16. Id.
17. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 21. Economic hard-
ship can indirectly increase a child's risk of developing a behavioral disorder because it may lead
to behavioral problems in the child's parents or increase the risk of child abuse. Exposure to
acts of violence, which may be more likely for children in impoverished communities, can also
cause stress-related mental health problems. Overcrowding or large family size can also predis-
pose children to certain mental health disorders. For a discussion of "psychosocial risk factors"
that can endanger a child's mental health, see MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON
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unmet.'8 The burden these children suffer can be crippling. Out of all
of the health conditions that children might experience, emotional and
behavioral impairments are most likely to lower their quality of life
and reduce their opportunities for success in adulthood. "No other set
of conditions is close in the magnitude of its deleterious effects on
children and youth . ... "19
There are a variety of mental health disorders that can affect youth,
such as anxiety disorders, mood or depressive disorders (including bi-
polar disorder), conduct disorders, and Attention Deficit Hyperactiv-
ity Disorder (ADHD). 20 These and other mental health disorders can
affect a child's ability to function at home, at school, and in his com-
munity more generally. 21 Children who experience emotional or be-
havioral problems can often benefit from mental health evaluations
and treatment regardless of whether doctors have formally diagnosed
or identified one of these disorders.22 A child whose functioning is
significantly impaired as a result of a mental health disorder is charac-
terized as having a "serious emotional disturbance." 2 3
States struggle to respond to the needs of these children, especially
those with complex needs.24 While some states are trying to develop
appropriate public health frameworks to address these needs, progress
GENERAL, supra note 15, at 130, and MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, Supra
note 1, at 21.
18. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 121.
19. Id. at 17.
20. For a detailed description of mental health disorders affecting children and youth, includ-
ing assessment and diagnosis considerations, prevalence, causes, and treatment modalities, see
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 136-67. These
disorders can manifest in different ways. Anxiety disorders include post-traumatic stress disor-
ders, phobias, panic disorders, and obsessive compulsive disorders. Id. at 160. Five percent of
children have ADHD, and these children can be impulsive, inattentive, hyperactive, aggressive,
or some combination thereof. Susan P. Leviton, Children of Color with Mental Health Problems:
Stuck in All the Wrong Places, 2 MARGINS 13, 15 (2002).
21. See MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 123.
22. Due to a variety of reasons, including lack of insurance, limited insurance coverage of
mental health services, the stigma surrounding mental health problems in their families and com-
munities, and inaccurate diagnoses, poor children and children of color with mental health disor-
ders often go undiagnosed and go without needed services. See id. at 20.
23. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING SENSE OF MEDICAID FOR CHILDREN
WITH SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 2 (1999), available at http://www.bazelon.orglLink
Click.aspx?fileticket=KZ5bUO8S1yM%3d&tabid=104 [hereinafter BAZELON CTR. FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING SENSE OF MEDICAID] ("About one in five children suffers from
a diagnosable mental, emotional or behavioral disorder, and a significant proportion of these
children have disorders that have a substantial impact on their ability to function. According to
recent estimates, 9-13% of children aged 9-17 have a serious emotional disturbance which
causes a 'substantial functional impairment;' 5-9% have a serious emotional disturbance which
causes 'extreme functional impairment."' (footnote omitted)).
24. COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
DEPA UL LAW RE VIEW
is slow. 2 5 Although most states have some programs in place to ad-
dress the mental health needs of children, only a small number are
addressing these problems for children from birth to age twenty-one. 26
Today's calls for reform in the field of children's mental health echo
many of the concerns articulated in the 1960s: most children in need of
mental health services are not getting them, and those served are
often placed in excessively restrictive settings.27 More community-
based treatment options short of hospitalization and residential treat-
ment are needed. 28 Mental health services that are proven to achieve
stability for a child without institutionalization are underutilized. 29
One of the most troublesome consequences of the failure of public
agencies to ensure that children are provided with these community-
based services is the unnecessary institutionalization of children, a
consequence that Mary suffered when all of the systems that were re-
sponsible for her mental health, education, and stability failed her.
This institutionalization often occurs at RTCs, which provide varying
types of services30 and range from structured facilities resembling hos-
pitals to those that are more similar to group homes or halfway
houses.31 These facilities may describe themselves as "wilderness
therapy programs, boarding schools, academies, behavioral modifica-
tion facilities, and boot camps, among other names." 32 Many of these
facilities are privately owned, and parents with financial resources can
directly place their children in these centers. However, most children
from low-income families are placed in RTCs through a number of
different state and local agencies, including health care, mental health,
25. Id. See generally BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STILL WAITING . . . THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF OLMSTEAD 1, 2 (2009) (finding that ten years after the Court's deci-
sion in Olmstead, public mental health systems have yet to adequately shift toward more cost-
effective, community-based approaches to mental health) [hereinafter BAZELON CTR. FOR
MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STILL WAITING].
26. COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
27. BETH A. STROUL, SYSTEMS OF CARE: A FRAMEWORK FOR SYSTEM REFORM IN CHIL-
DREN'S MENTAL HEALTH 2 (2002), available at http://gucchd.georgetown.edu/products/SOCIs-
sueBrief.pdf.
28. Id.
29. See discussion infra Part IV. For a discussion of services that can benefit youth with
mental health disorders, particularly those of color and those involved in the delinquency sys-
tem, see Leviton, supra note 20, at 17, 33-35.
30. RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 4, at i. RTCs typically market them-
selves for "boys and girls with a variety of addiction, behavioral, and emotional problems" and
"provide a range of services, including drug and alcohol treatment, confidence building, military-
style discipline, and psychological counseling" for illnesses such as depression and attention defi-
cit disorder. Id.
31. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 170.
32. RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 4, at 1.
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juvenile justice, child welfare, and special education agencies. 33 Poor
children are disproportionately sent to RTCs, meaning that federal
and state funding-and therefore taxpayers-pay for most of this in-
stitutionalization. 34 Children can remain in these facilities, at a cost of
hundreds of dollars per child per day for many months or even
years,35 long after they are ready for discharge, as a result of the un-
availability and inadequacy of mental health services in their home
communities.36 By funneling children into these high-cost treatment
centers, states are spending money that they could otherwise be using
to build robust, effective, and less expensive community-based mental
health services.37 While only eight percent of children treated for
mental health disorders spend time in a residential facility, "nearly
one-fourth of the national outlay on child mental health is spent on
care in these settings."38
Despite arguments in favor of RTCs citing community protection,
child protection, and the benefits of residential treatment, "none of
these justifications have stood up to research scrutiny." 39 The growing
33. See Lenore Behar et al., Protecting Youth Placed in Unlicensed, Unregulated Residential
"Treatment" Facilities, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 399, 408 (2007); RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS,
supra note 4, at 1.
34. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274. Medicaid and state mental health agencies pay for approxi-
mately 31% of RTCs, and other public agencies, such as child welfare and juvenile justice agen-
cies, pay for another 50%. Id.
35. The court monitor in Dixon v. Gray reported on estimates by the District of Columbia
Office of the City Administrator that the city spends approximately $37.5 million per year to
place 425 youth in RTCs. That means, on average, that the city spends $88,235 per year, or $241
per day, to fund a child's residential treatment placement. DENNIS R. JONES, COURT MONITOR,
REPORT TO THE COURT 36 (2008). The Justice Policy Institute compiled data of state spending
on post-adjudication commitment of youth in the delinquency system to residential facilities and
found that the cost per day per youth in some states can be can be more than $400. JUSTICE
POLICY INST., THE COSTS OF CONFINEMENT: WHY GOOD JUVENILE JUSTICE POLICIES MAKE
GOOD FISCAL SENSE 4 (2009), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05
REPCostsOfConfinementJJPS.pdf. The Bazelon Center cites the cost at up to $700 per day.
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, FACT SHEET: CHILDREN IN RESIDENTIAL TREAT-
MENT CENTERS 6, available at http://bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=D5NL7igVCA%3D
&tabid=247.
36. These children, who remain in psychiatric hospitals and RTCs after they are ready for
discharge due to the unavailability of necessary community-based mental health services to
make their return possible, are sometimes referred to as "stuck kids." Alyssa E. Scaparotti,
Serious Emotional Disturbances: Children's Fight for Community-Based Services Through Medi-
caid Litigation, 41 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 193, 196 (2007); Lois Weithorn, Envisioning Second-
Order Change in America's Responses to Troubled and Troublesome Youth, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1305, 1310 (2005).
37. Scaparotti, supra note 36.
38. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 169. As of
2005, up to 50,000 children per year are housed in RTCs. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274.
39. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15; see also
Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274.
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body of research in this area reveals that a child's stay in these costly
facilities does not result in better outcomes for the child and that
evidence-based mental health treatment in the community more effec-
tively serves the child. 4 0 A U.S. Surgeon General report describes va-
rious factors leading to ineffective treatment in these facilities,
including the failure of children in those placements to learn behavior
needed in the community, the possibility of trauma associated with the
separation from the family, difficulty reentering the family, and even
actual abandonment by the family following a child's release from the
facility.41
When a child is placed in residential treatment, the facility is often
locked, highly structured, and located far from the child's home. In
these ways and others, the experience does not mirror the home and
community to which the child will eventually return and in which she
will need to function.42 A child does not learn how to live with her
family in her own community at an RTC, and her family does not
learn how to effectively include her in the household and address her
needs.43 The distance from home often makes meaningful contact and
involvement in the child's treatment by family members or other im-
portant individuals impossible, especially for families with limited re-
sources, reducing the efficacy of treatment.4 4 A child's removal from
her home and community "deprive[s] the child of important connec-
tions and developmental opportunities." 4 5 These youth are also at
risk of learning antisocial or bizarre behavior from intensive exposure
to other disturbed children. 4 6 Research shows that community-based
mental health treatment, through which children can develop and
maintain relationships with their families and a broader range of
40. See, e.g., MODELS FOR CHANGE, RESEARCH ON PATHWAYS TO DESISTANCE 5 (2009),
available at http://www.modelsforchange.net/publications/239; MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., PER-
SPECTIVES ON RESIDENTIAL AND COMMUNrTY-BASED TREATMENT FOR YOUTH AND FAMILIES 2
(2008), available at http://www.mtfc.com/2008%2OMagellan%20RTC%2OWhite%2OPaper.pdf.
There is no evidence that youth with violent or aggressive tendencies improve in RTCs.
MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 170.
41. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15.
42. See COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.,
wHITE PAPER COMMUNITY ALTERNATIVES TO PSYCHIATRIC RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT FACIL-
rrY SERVICES 2 (2008), available at http://www.pccyfs.org/dpw-ocyfs/OMHSAS-PRTF_.Paper
(Final)04%2704%2708.pdf ("Furthermore, there is no evidence of a relationship between any
outcomes achieved in residential treatment and subsequent functioning in the community.").
43. See Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1505 ("[Plolicy responses that rely primarily on out-of-
home placements are likely to provide little more than short-term containment of a crisis and
will undoubtedly fail.").
44. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274.
45. Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1452.
46. See MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 170.
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peers, is both more effective and less costly than residential services,
making the nationwide shortage of community-based services for chil-
dren with mental health disorders all the more distressing.47
Children are also at risk of abuse and neglect at RTCs.4 8 A report
by the American Bar Association's Youth at Risk Initiative detailed
numerous basic human rights violations at RTCs, including youth
deaths, inhumane and degrading discipline, 4 9 inappropriate and dan-
gerous use of seclusion and restraint,50 medical and nutritional neg-
lect,51 and severe restrictions on communications and visits with
parents, attorneys, and advocates.5 2 In a report investigating abuse
and deaths in residential treatment programs for youth, the U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office identified thousands of allegations of
abuse at RTCs across the country, some of which resulted in death.53
With many children placed in RTCs far from home, often in other
states, 5 4 the lack of resources, bureaucratic hurdles, geographic limita-
47. Dennis E. Cichon, The Ignored Populations: Children in the Mental Health System, 17
T.M. COOLEY L. Rev. 9, 9 (2000).
48. Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274.
49. Although the American Bar Association specifically focused on unregulated private
RTCs, its report noted that forty-five percent of respondents stated that they were sometimes or
often emotionally, physically, or sexually abused by staff. Behar et al., supra note 33, at 406.
Specific reports of inhumane treatment included reports of forced labor, restricted access to the
bathroom, scare tactics, and exposure to harsh elements like extreme heat, snow, or rain. Id.
50. One survey respondent noted:
They had a room with tile flooring where the kids went at 6:00 am until 10:00 pm,
where each hour you would rotate positions. One hour would be lying on your stom-
ach with your chin on the ground, the next position was standing on your knees for an
hour and the next one was standing for an hour with your nose to the wall.
They would duct tape your hands behind your back then your legs together then
wrap you up in a blanket like a burrito and duct tape that tighter so you couldn't move
or get out. Sometimes it would be so tight kids would be screaming that they couldn't
breathe and really start panicking. They made the students do this to other students.
Id. at 405.
51. Respondents reported food and nutritional deprivation, sleep deprivation, and excessive
exercise. Id. at 406.
52. Letters and conversations were filtered, restricted, or interrupted; similarly, calls, visits,
and other parental contact were limited, sometimes for as long as six months. Id. at 401, 405.
53. In looking at data from the years 1990 through 2007, the allegations examined by the
GAO included
reports of abuse and death recorded by state agencies and the Department of Health
and Human Services, allegations detailed in pending civil and criminal trials with hun-
dreds of plaintiffs, and claims of abuse and death that were posted on the Internet. For
example, during 2005 alone, 33 states reported 1,619 staff members involved in inci-
dents of abuse in residential programs.
RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 4, at i.
54. See Position Statement 44: Residential Treatment for Children and Adolescents with Serious
Mental Health and Substance Use Conditions, MENTAL HEALTH AM., http://www.nmha.org/go/
position-statements/44 (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
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tions, and other obstacles facing state and local agencies funding these
placements make it difficult for agency officials to visit children in
these facilities and provide effective oversight and monitoring.55 The
infrequency of visits from family members and state officials com-
pounds the risk of abuse, neglect, and dangerous restraint and seclu-
sion practices.56
Despite the overwhelming costs to both taxpayers and to many of
the children who are sent there by public agencies, the overuse of
RTCs is not a widely known or discussed problem among policymak-
ers, courts, or scholars. The range of names for these types of facilities
masks their true character. In most instances, RTCs are "total institu-
tions," closed worlds where the residents are regimented, surrounded
only by other residents, and unable to leave the premises.57 However,
the terminology used to describe these facilities as "centers" or
"homes" that provide "care," rather than "institutions" or "hospitals,"
may contribute to the invisibility of the problem by making it seem
more benign. The more prominent concerns regarding the institution-
alization of adults with mental disabilities in state psychiatric hospi-
tals, for example, have not typically been extended to the discussion of
the placement of children in RTCs. Family court judges and attorneys
usually do not engage in intensive due process considerations or exer-
cise significant caution and scrutiny when a public agency proposes to
send a child to residential treatment. Because these facilities are not
treated as institutions, such placements may never come before a
court for review. However, due to the high financial cost, the unnec-
essary restriction on the liberty interests of children, the likelihood of
poor outcomes for these children, and the societal costs that can result
from a child's continued instability, policymakers, courts, attorneys,
and the general public should all be concerned about the overuse of
55. RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT PROGRAMS, supra note 4, at i; Vaughn, supra note 3, at 274;
Amended Complaint at 43-44, Charlie H. v. Whitman, No. 99-3678 (GEB) (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2000).
56. See, e.g., UNIv. LEGAL SERVS., INC., OUT OF STATE, OUT OF MIND: THE HIDDEN LIVES OF
D.C. YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL TREATMENT CENTERS 5-6 (2009), available at http://www.uls-dc.
orglout%20of%20state%20out%20of%20mind%20revision%20final.pdf. The Washington City
Paper noted that many incidents of violence in RTCs go unreported. Jason Cherkis, Boxed In,
WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/40237/outsourc-
ing-troubled-dc-kids/full.
57. See ERVING GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PA-
TIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 12 (1961) (analyzing the characteristics of "total institutions" and
arguing that the most important factor affecting a patient in a mental hospital is the institution,
not his illness, and that his reactions and adjustments are the same as those of inmates in other
types of institutions, such as prisons).
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residential treatment for children with mental health needs, especially
as the rates of admission to these facilities continue to increase.58
III. LEGAL REGIMES THAT PROMOTE THE PROVISION OF MENTAL
HEALTH TREATMENT IN THE COMMUNITY AND FREEDOM
FROM INSTITUTIONALIZATION
Various federal legal regimes that affect children with mental health
disorders are structured to ensure that these children receive services
and treatment in the community and remain out of institutional set-
tings whenever possible. While most scholars, courts, attorneys, and
government agencies view the needs of at-risk children through one
particular lens, a broader analysis of the intersections among federal
legal regimes related to child welfare, juvenile justice, disability rights,
healthcare, and special education reveals that all of these regimes
share common goals. Federal statutes, their accompanying regula-
tions, and case law in all of these realms require local and state agen-
cies to provide children with necessary mental health and educational
services in their communities, not just in institutions. These federal
legal regimes also mandate that different child-serving public agencies
coordinate with one another to ensure that children receive timely
services to address their mental health disorders and behavioral
problems in their homes, schools, and communities. If the aims of
these legal regimes were carried out as intended, more children would
receive the treatment they need, thereby avoiding needless institution-
alization in ineffective and costly RTCs.
A. The Child Welfare Legal Regime
Children in foster care are routinely denied adequate education,
and mental and physical health care....
Despite benevolent interventions and billions of dollars, the govern-
ment has proven to be a poor surrogate parent-seemingly incapa-
ble of ensuring that these children receive the education, medical
care and counseling that all children need. In the end, troubled chil-
dren end up as troubled adults. The personal anguish becomes a
public calamity. 59
Children involved in the child welfare system have high rates of
mental health needs. Some children enter the system because their
58. Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1310.
59. STATE OF CAL. LITrLE HOOVER COMM'N, STILL IN OUR HANDS: No LEADER, No Ac-
COUNTABILITY 1, 2 (2003), available at http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/168/reportl68.pdf (internal
quotation marks omitted) (providing a report to California Governor Gray Davis on the state of
the foster care system in California).
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parents are unable to control their behavior or because the children
are in a constant state of emotional crisis. As a result, it appears to
the child welfare system that the parents cannot adequately supervise
the child or that they have abused the child. Child welfare agencies
might also mistakenly view the parent's inability to control the child
or the child's instability as neglect. Other parents may actually abuse
or neglect a child in response to the child's attention deficits, behavior
problems, difficult temperaments, or aggression.60 Such problems on
a child's part, or parental perception of these problems, are associated
with a higher risk of child maltreatment.61 When parents have poor
coping skills, difficulty controlling their emotions, or difficulty em-
pathizing with their child, they are even more likely to maltreat a child
with mental health or behavioral problems. 62 The maltreatment might
only serve to reinforce the behavioral problems and create conditions
that lead to a reoccurrence of the maltreatment, such as when a physi-
cally abused child exhibits increased aggression, eliciting further harsh
reactions from his parents. 63 A parent may be charged with abuse or
neglect as a result of her attempts to curb the child's out-of-control
behavior or to keep that child or his siblings safe.
Other parents who have clearly not engaged in any abuse or neglect
are so desperate to secure mental health services for their children
that they agree to give up custody of their children to child welfare
agencies in the hopes of obtaining needed treatment for their children.
For example, some parents are denied needed services by their health
insurance, cannot afford out-of-pocket mental health expenses, or
have not been able to otherwise secure necessary mental health ser-
vices for their children. These parents sometimes engage in a phe-
nomenon known as "custody relinquishment" by filing a petition in
dependency court in an effort to force the state to provide mental
health services. 64 In extreme cases, some innocent parents even claim
60. JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A COORDINATED RE-





64. See, e.g., North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 139 (D.C. 1979); Cichon, supra note
47, at 11 (noting that in South Dakota, a sparsely populated state, at least seventy-five families
annually relinquished custody of a child with an emotional impairment by filing Child in Need of
Supervision petitions with the juvenile court because they were unable to access services by
other means).
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that they have abused or neglected their children in order to obtain
services. 65
The New York Times described the difficulties faced by these par-
ents, who are often dealing not only with a child who has mental ill-
ness, but also with the child's siblings' reactions, as well as the parents'
own exhaustion and frustration in trying to access needed services. 66
The challenges these parents faced in trying to secure necessary
mental health services for their children reflect the frequent failure of
private insurance to pay for intensive treatment, the small number of
state-financed beds for mental health patients, and the long wait list
for mental health services. 67
When a parent turns over his child to obtain services or the child
enters foster care as a result of an abuse or neglect allegation, the
parent cannot just ask for the child back; he has to obtain the approval
of a judge. The parent has no control over where his child is sent or,
in some cases, what treatment the child receives. Some parents who
have relinquished custody have even lost track of their children en-
tirely.6 8 When these children enter the foster care system, that system
must often turn to the same overburdened community of mental
health clinics that could not initially meet the needs of these chil-
dren.6 9 Local child welfare agencies are likely to place these children
with foster parents who are unaware of their mental health problems
and lack the necessary training to deal with them. 70 Many of these
children inevitably end up admitted to psychiatric hospitals or RTCs. 71
These problems are not limited to the state of New York. Unfortu-
65. See Rebecca G. W. Random, Custody Relinquishment to Obtain Mental Health Services, 7
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 475, 478 (2005).
66. See Shaila K. Dewan, Parents of Mentally Ill Children Trade Custody for Care, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2003, at N35; see also Ericka S. Garcia, Where Do Foster Children with Disabili-
ties Fit?: How the State Legislatures Must Create the Programs for Specialized Services to Ensure
the Proper Fit, 30 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 131, 149 (2008); Tracy J. Simmons, Relinquishing Cus-
tody in Exchange for Mental Healthcare Services: Undermining the Adoption and Safe Families
Act's Promise of Reasonable Efforts Towards Family Preservation and Reunification, 10 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 377 (2008).
67. See Dewan, supra note 66. At the time, there were only 610 spots in New York for a
Medicaid program that pays for services such as in-home counseling for children who are at risk
of being hospitalized. Id. Theoretically, children in foster care can be sent to facilities that have
many more openings and at least some mental health services. Officials at the New York City
Administration for Children's Services estimated that half their intensive-care beds were filled
not with children who had been abused or neglected, but with children who were "placed there




70. Cichon, supra note 47, at 11.
71. Id. at 11-12.
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nately, "the quandary of custody versus care is a phenomenon
throughout the country." 72
In North v. D.C. Board of Education, the district court examined a
situation in which the local school board was urging a couple to relin-
quish custody to secure mental health treatment for their child.73 The
court concluded that a neglect proceeding was inappropriate and
credited expert testimony that a neglect proceeding would have a dev-
astating impact on the child's course of treatment.74
The child's emotional problems have been significantly exacerbated
by his perception that he has been abandoned by his parents, and
the unrefuted medical opinion is that the stigma of having his par-
ents adjudicated neglectful and unwilling to care for him would seri-
ously cripple efforts to deal with his problems and to reunite his
family.
The court admonished the Board of Education, which forced the fam-
ily to "face the Hobson's choice" of giving up the necessary treatment
or suffering the emotional damage that would accompany a neglect
finding, finding that either choice would cause irreparable injury.76
When children enter the child welfare system, whether their parents
voluntarily relinquished custody or were involuntarily subject to alle-
gations of abuse and neglect, they are likely to require some form of
mental health treatment. Many of these children have unmet mental
health needs associated with the maltreatment they suffered or the
effects of separation from their families. The federal statutes that gov-
ern the child welfare system aim to provide children with necessary
community-based mental health treatment both prior to removal from
their biological homes and while in out-of-home placements, such as
foster homes.77 These statutes also intend for children to be placed in
72. Dewan, supra note 66.
73. North v. D.C. Bd. of Educ., 471 F. Supp. 136, 136-37 (D.C. 1979). The school board
argued the appropriate procedure for the child to receive required mental health services was for
his family to pursue a neglect action so that he could be placed in the custody of the city's child
welfare agency, which could only fund necessary treatment if the child was adjudicated neglected
and placed in the agency's permanent custody. Id. at 139-41.
74. Id. at 140.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 141.
77. The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act was enacted in 1974 to require states to
establish child abuse reporting procedures and provides guidelines for agencies to work together
in that process. 42 U.S.C. § 5106 (2006). The Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980 was established to protect children, while maintaining and reunifying families and requires
reasonable efforts to prevent unnecessary removal of a child from his home. Pub. L. No. 96-272,
94 Stat. 500 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Adoption and Safe Families Act
amended the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1997, with a focus on promoting the
adoption of children in foster care. Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2116 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Child and Family Services Improvement Act of 2006 was passed with
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the most family-like setting near their parents' home, rather than in
congregate care facilities like RTCs.
Federal child welfare laws require states to take affirmative steps to
try to maintain the family unit, and discourage out-of-home place-
ments.78 To prevent removal from the home, states in receipt of fed-
eral funding must make "reasonable efforts" to preserve and reunify
the intent to promote stable families. Pub. L. No. 109-288, 120 Stat. 1233 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C.). The Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of
2008 improved outcomes for children in foster care and improved incentives for adoption. Pub.
L. No. 110-351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). These statutes incen-
tivize states to provide mental health treatment, coordinate with other agencies, and place chil-
dren in family-like settings close to their parents' homes through grants and through
conditioning federal funding on compliance.
78. Although this Article focuses on statutory regimes, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution might also serve to protect the rights of children in the custody of state child wel-
fare systems to a minimum level of mental health treatment. In Youngberg v. Romeo, the Su-
preme Court assessed the rights of an individual with intellectual disabilities who was
involuntarily committed to a state institution under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court determined that the Due Process Clause does
confer rights to "safe conditions of confinement, freedom from bodily restraint, and training or
'habilitation"' as considered reasonable in the judgment of a qualified professional. Id. at 307.
After acknowledging the right to certain basic provisions as food, clothing, shelter, and medical
care, the Court determined that "the State is under a duty to provide respondent with such
training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to
facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints." Id. at 324. The Court later limited
its holding in Youngberg to "stand only for the proposition that when the State takes a person
into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corre-
sponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being." DeShaney v.
Winnebago Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989). In a footnote, the Court
noted that although such a duty was not found in the DeShaney case where the child was not in
state custody, a constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause might exist for children in
foster care, analogous to the duty owed when an individual is institutionalized or incarcerated, as
those children have been removed by a state agency from their parents and placed into state
custody. Id. at 201 n.9.
Several federal courts have found that states are not required under the Constitution to pro-
vide children in foster care with an optimal level of treatment or with the least restrictive ar-
rangement. See, e.g., Baby Neal v. Casey, 821 F. Supp. 320, 337 (E.D. Pa. 1993); Del A. v.
Roemer, 777 F. Supp. 1297, 1319-20 (E.D. La. 1991). Despite these interpretations of
DeShaney, the Court did note in Youngberg that patients involuntarily confined to institutions
should be afforded a minimal degree of habilitation or training if it will allow them to "signifi-
cantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence." Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324.
This principle can be analogized to require the provision of services to children in foster care
that would reduce or eliminate the need for ineffective, detrimental, involuntary institutionaliza-
tion in an overly restrictive placement, such as an RTC. Because Youngberg looks to the judg-
ment of a qualified professional to determine the reasonableness of conditions of confinement
and the growing body of research on residential treatment is beginning to show its ineffective-
ness and harmfulness, it might be possible to satisfy the standards set by Youngberg and
DeShaney to argue for necessary community-based mental health treatment and freedom from
institutionalization in RTCs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, with the subsequent passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead interpreting the ADA to prohibit unnecessary institution-
alization of individuals with disabilities, it is likely that a court would look to the ADA, rather
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families.79 A child can only be removed from her home and placed in
foster care if a voluntary placement agreement is entered into by a
parent or guardian, or if a judicial determination has been made that
the child's current living situation is "contrary to the welfare of the
child" after reasonable efforts have been made to preserve the fam-
ily.80 To maintain the family unit, at-risk families frequently require
appropriate and effective mental health services for both the children
and adults, and therefore, a child welfare agency's "reasonable ef-
forts" to preserve a family should often include these services. Each
state must also create a plan for child welfare services, which includes,
among other things, "a preplacement preventive services program de-
signed to help children at risk of foster care placement to remain
safely with their families." 8' Behavioral and emotional problems that
can lead to abuse or neglect, or that flow from abuse or neglect, 82 can
prevent a family from staying together. Therefore, preventive pro-
grams should include community-based mental health services for a
child at risk of removal from the home.83 Through these reasonable-
efforts and preventive-services-program requirements, child welfare
laws are structured to ensure that children and families receive com-
munity-based mental health services to prevent their removal from
the home and placement into foster care.84
Pursuant to the federal child welfare regime, children who are ulti-
mately removed from their homes and placed in other settings should
also receive necessary community-based mental health treatment. Ef-
fective mental health treatment is critical for children who have en-
tered the child welfare system and have been placed in foster care,
whether the goal is reunification with the biological family or another
form of permanency, such as adoption or guardianship. These chil-
dren often require mental health treatment to address the abuse or
neglect that led to their entry into the system, the trauma associated
with removal from their home and biological families, or their under-
than the constitutional standards discussed in Youngberg, in assessing the rights of children with
disabilities to freedom from institutionalization in RTCs. See discussion infra Part III.E.
79. To receive payment under the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, states must make
"reasonable efforts" to "preserve and reunify families." 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B) (2006).
80. Id. § 672(a)(2)(A).
81. Id. § 622(b)(8)(A)(iv).
82. For a discussion of the connection between childhood maltreatment and mental health
disorders, see MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 132.
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 629g(f)(4)(B) (promoting a reduction in out-of-home placements).
84. See, e.g., Complaint, H.B. v. Emkes, No. 3:11-cv-00663 (M.D. Tenn. July 11, 2011)
(describing the situation of multiple plaintiffs who have been forced into residential treatment
because the state had reduced the availability of at-home services available to families and per-
sons with disabilities).
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lying mental health disorders. State child welfare agencies are gener-
ally responsible for ensuring adequate health and mental health
services85 and appropriate school placements for children in foster
care.86 To receive federal funding for their child welfare systems,
states must develop a plan for the delivery of health care services for
children in foster care, including care for mental health needs.8 7
States must have a strategy in place to identify and respond to these
needs.88 The ongoing oversight and coordination of health care ser-
vices for any child in a foster care placement is critical to "ensure a
coordinated strategy to identify and respond to the health care needs
of children in foster care placements, including mental health and den-
tal health needs." 89
The federal legal regime is also structured to prevent the institution-
alization of children in the foster care system in RTCs through a case-
planning and review process intended to ensure that a child is placed
close to home in a family-like, rather than institutional, setting.90 The
"case review system" aims to assure that a child's case plan is "de-
signed to achieve placement in a safe setting that is the least restrictive
(most family like) and most appropriate setting available and in close
proximity to the parents' home, consistent with the best interest and
special needs of the child." 91 For most children, the least restrictive
and the most family-like setting in close proximity to their parents'
home will not be an RTC, given that these centers are institutional in
nature, provide congregate care rather than family care, and are often
located far from where many of the children's families reside.
Federal statutes provide for a check on the placement situation of a
child who has been removed from his biological home by the child
welfare system. A six-month administrative or court review evaluates
the safety of the child as well as the necessity and appropriateness of
the placement, the extent of progress made toward alleviating the
causes necessitating the placement, and a likely date by which the
child can be returned home or be placed for adoption or guardian-
ship.92 This review hearing provides an opportunity for family court
85. See 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(15).
86. Id. § 671(a)(30). Children in foster care unfortunately end up in more restrictive school
placements than are necessary. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES IN
THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM: BARRIERS TO SUCCESS AND PROPOSED POLICY SOLUTIONS 66
(2008).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 622(b)(15)(A).
88. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C.A. § 622(b)(15)(A) (2011).
90. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(16).
91. Id. § 675(5)(A).
92. Id. § 675(5)(B).
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judges, attorneys, and social workers to ensure that a child is in the
least restrictive setting in close proximity to the parents' home. If not,
the hearing provides an opportunity to put in place any supports and
services the child might require to be successful in a less restrictive,
closer placement, such as any needed mental health services.
Federal law further disfavors distant placements by requiring a
caseworker to justify any placements that are a "substantial distance
from the home" or in a different state, including any distant RTC
placements. 93 If a child is placed in a different state, a caseworker
must visit the child no less than every six months and submit a report
to the state agency in the child's parents' state that includes the justifi-
cation for the child's distant placement. 94
Federal child welfare statutes also reflect a strong interest in coordi-
nation among various state agencies that addresses the needs of chil-
dren generally and mental health care in particular. In particular,
child welfare statutes encourage the improvement of collaboration be-
tween state child welfare and juvenile justice 95 and health agencies. 96
Federal grants are provided to states for training to improve commu-
nication between child welfare agencies and health care agencies, 97
and to states that are implementing some form of collaboration.98 A
description of policies that support this collaboration must be in a
state's proposal in order to receive federal funding.99 Grants are also
available to promote partnerships between agencies aimed at recon-
necting children in foster care with their families.100 In addition, Con-
gress requires the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services to coordinate between federal agencies in order to maximize
services provided to children.1ox
Impact litigation aimed at reform of child welfare systems across
the country evidences the continued failure of states to realize the in-
tentions of this legal regime. 102 In the District of Columbia, for exam-
93. Id. § 675(5)(A)(i).
94. Id. § 675(5)(A)(ii). The caseworker can be from either the state where the child is placed,
the state where the child's parents live, or a private agency under contract with either state.
95. Id. § 5106a(a)(13).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(a)(14).
97. Id. § 5106(a)(1)(D).
98. Id. § 5106(a)(2), (a)(5).
99. Id. § 5106a(b)(2)(D).
100. Id. § 627(a)(1)(E) (repealed).
101. Id. § 5113(b)(8).
102. See, e.g., Kenny A. v. Perdue, No. 1:02-cv-1686-MHS, 2004 WL 5503780 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
13, 2004); R.C. v. Nachman, 969 F. Supp. 682 (M.D. Ala. 1997); Consent Decree, B.H. v. Suter,
No. 88-C-5599 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 1991), available at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/
JI-IL-0001-0001.pdf; Complaint, Henry A. v. Willden, No. 2:10-CV-00528 (D. Nev. Apr. 13,
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ple, the ongoing jurisdiction of the federal court in overseeing a long-
standing class action litigation originally aimed at reforming the city's
child welfare system reveals the system's continued deficiencies.
When the plaintiffs in LaShawn A. v. Barry originally filed their com-
plaint in 1989, they painted a picture of a broken system, one in which
children in foster care were sent to congregate care placements across
the country, instead of family-like settings in the District of Columbia
or in a nearby jurisdiction.10 3 No services were available to stabilize
children and families, and assist them with reunification.10 4  The
named plaintiff was kept in emergency care for over two years with no
plans for placement,10 5 and no efforts were made to provide her
mother with services. 06
Over twenty years later, many of the same problems persist and the
Implementation and Exit Plan developed by the parties remains un-
fulfilled, with the D.C. Child and Family Services Agency closely
watched by a court monitor.107 Despite the requirement in the Exit
Plan that 90% of families like LaShawn's-families deemed to be in
need of services-be referred to community-based organizations, 08
only thirty-three percent of those families are currently receiving such
referrals. 109 Children remain in congregate care settings like group
homes and RTCs,"x0 and the child welfare agency continues to place
2010). In B.H., the plaintiffs, children in Illinois, alleged they were taken from their homes due
to alleged abuse or neglect, but then were subjected to conditions that damaged their mental
health and provided little improvement to their safety. Consent Decree, B.H., at 2. Once placed
outside the home, they faced violence in shelters and abuse in foster homes; many were moved
six or more times. Id. As of 2009, the goal of keeping children in their homes whenever possible
was only being met 70.8% of the time, as opposed to the requisite 95%. CHILDREN & FAMILY
RESEARCH CTR., CONDITIONS OF CHILDREN IN OR AT RISK OF FOSTER CARE IN ILLINOIS 1-15
(Tamara L. Fuller & Kathleen A. Kearney eds., 2009), available at http://www.aclu-il.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/CFRCUIUC_BH_2009.pdf. The agency also needs to improve its pro-
vision of assessments and services to children and families to prevent placement outside the
home and meet the needs of children in foster care in areas including education and mental
health. See id. at 5-16.
103. Complaint for Injunctive Relief at 2, LaShawn A. v. Barry, No. 89CV1754 (D.D.C. June
20, 1989), available at http://www.childrensrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/06/1989-6-20_dc-
lashawn.complaint.pdf.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 13.
106. Id. at 14.
107. See CTR. FOR THE STuDv OF Soc. POL'Y, LASHAWN A. v. GRAY PROGRESS REPORT FOR
THE PERIOD JULY 1-DECEMBER 31, 2010, at 20 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.cssp.org/
publications/child-welfare/class-action-reform/LaShawn-A-v.-Fenty-Monitoring-Report-May-2-
2011.pdf.
108. Id. at 33 tbl.1.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 21 tbl.1.
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children more than 100 miles from the District of Columbia.111 Many
children remain in settings that are more restrictive than they
require. 112
The intention of Congress for the child welfare system to ensure the
provision of necessary mental health services to children in foster care
was also not carried out in Mary's case. Mary's child welfare social
worker did not take steps to connect her with the counseling services
she required. The child welfare system also failed to coordinate with
her pediatrician or the health care, juvenile justice, and special educa-
tion systems, as intended by federal child welfare law. Moreover,
Mary's case demonstrates the failure of the child welfare system to
prevent her placement in a restrictive, distant, and out-of-state con-
gregate care facility, rather than ensuring her continued placement in
a family-like setting in her community. The agency would need to
justify why such a placement was in Mary's best interests, given that
federal child welfare laws explicitly disfavor this type of placement.
Because Mary is placed in a facility out of state, if her child welfare
agency caseworker fails to visit her at least every six months, the aims
of the child welfare laws to ensure monitoring of such placements
would also go unheeded.
B. The Special Education Legal Regime
[T]he educational needs of millions of children with disabilities were
not being fully met because-
(B) the children were excluded entirely from the public school
system and from being educated with their peers;
(C) undiagnosed disabilities prevented the children from having a
successful educational experience; or
(D) a lack of adequate resources within the public school system
forced families to find services outside the public school system....
(5) Almost 30 years of research and experiences has demon-
strated that the education of children with disabilities can be made
more effective by-
(A) having high expectations for such children and ensuring their
access to the general education curriculum in the regular classroom,
to the maximum extent possible, in order to-
111. Id. at 96.
112. See id. at 20 tbl.1. A recent evaluation of the mental health treatment available for chil-
dren in the District of Columbia found that the Child & Family Services Agency needs a more
detailed and comprehensive structure for identifying mental health needs. D.C. CITIZENS RE-
VIEw PANEL, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
GOVERNMENT'S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 2007 DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH AND CHILD
& FAMILY SERVICES AGENCY MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS ASSESSMENT (Feb. 2010).
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(ii) be prepared to lead productive and independent adult
lives . . . .113
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), the fed-
eral special education statute, mandates that children who require
special education be "identified, located and evaluated." 1 1 4 It further
requires that such children receive individualized education programs
(IEPs) with appropriate services and accommodations so that they can
receive meaningful academic benefit. 15 Children whose rights are vi-
olated and go without needed services can reach a point of crisis and
end up in RTCs.116
The IDEA aims to provide children with disabilities with a free ap-
propriate public education.117 Congress intended for schools to keep
their doors open to students with disabilities, rather than institutional-
izing them or excluding them altogether, in recognition of the long
history of schools excluding children who were "difficult" to edu-
cate."s The IDEA aims not only to address the academic needs of
children with disabilities, but also to comprehensively address their
behavioral needs and prepare them for transition to adult life.119 Ef-
fective protection of rights under special education law should almost
always result in the child's receipt of special education services in a
school in her community, rather than in residential treatment.
The process of identifying and serving a child through special edu-
cation involves a number of steps that are structured to allow students
to receive appropriate services in their communities and in the least
restrictive environment.120 First, states must identify, locate, and eval-
uate all children in need of special education.121 Known as "child
find," this obligation means that school districts must take affirmative
steps to initiate the special education process for any child who re-
quires it regardless of whether the parent has brought a child's disabil-
113. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(2) (2006) (articulating Congress's findings as part of its statements
and declarations introducing the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act).
114. Id. § 1412(a)(3).
115. Id. § 1400(d). An IEP is a written plan, developed by a team that includes critical school
staff and the parent, that documents the special education services, accommodations, and goals.
116. Unlike some of the other statutes discussed in this Article, the IDEA is privately en-
forceable, after administrative remedies are exhausted, through the filing of a civil action in
federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2)(A).
117. Id. § 1412(a)(1).
118. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 323 (1988) ("Congress very much meant to strip schools
of the unilateral authority they had traditionally employed to exclude disabled students . . .
119. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
120. Id. § 1412(a)(5).
121. Id. § 1412(a)(3).
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ities to the attention of a school or made a request for special
education. 122 Evaluations must assess children in all areas of sus-
pected disability.123 For a child with social, emotional, or behavioral
difficulties, a clinical psychological evaluation might be necessary be-
cause it may provide a vehicle for a clinical psychologist to determine
whether the child is suffering from a diagnosable mental health disor-
der or is otherwise in need of school-based services or other mental
health treatment.124
Once the evaluation process is complete, a child must meet eligibil-
ity criteria for one of the enumerated special education disability clas-
sifications,125 as determined by a multidisciplinary team that reviews
the evaluations and any other relevant data and information about the
child.126 Children with emotional or behavioral challenges might be
found eligible for special education classified under the classification
of "emotional disturbance," defined as
a condition exhibiting one or more of the following characteristics
over a long period of time and to a marked degree that adversely
affects a child's educational performance:
(A) An inability to learn that cannot be explained by intellectual,
sensory, or health factors.
(B) An inability to build or maintain satisfactory interpersonal
relationships with peers and teachers.
(C) Inappropriate types of behavior or feelings under normal
circumstances.
(D) A general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression.
(E) A tendency to develop physical symptoms or fears associated
with personal or school problems. 127
Interestingly, this definition does not require any specific diagnosis.
Children who do not meet the criteria for a particular mental health
disorder under the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disor-
ders used by mental health professionals to diagnose individuals, but
otherwise meet one of the listed criteria for eligibility as a child with
emotional disturbance, such as children who exhibit inappropriate be-
havior, have a general pervasive mood of unhappiness, or have fears
associated with school, are still entitled to special education services
under this disability classification so long as the problem has occurred
to a marked degree, has lasted over a long period of time, and has
122. Id.
123. See id. § 1414(b)(3)(B).
124. See generally Ruth Colker, Educational Evaluations and Assessments, in SPECIAL EDUCA-
TION ADVOCACY, supra note 6, at 83.
125. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401(3), 1414(b)(4).
126. See id. § 1414(b)-(c).
127. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i) (2010).
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adversely affected the child's educational performance. Because
neither the statute nor regulations defines what is meant by "to a
marked degree" or "a long period of time," these terms are open to
interpretation. Two children exhibiting similar behaviors could end
up with different results when the multidisciplinary team discusses the
question of their eligibility under the "emotional disturbance" classifi-
cation. The regulations also specify that children who are "socially
maladjusted" are explicitly excluded unless they meet the definition
above. 2 Some schools might try to avoid a finding of eligibility and
the provision of services to a child with behavioral problems by argu-
ing that the child is simply socially maladjusted, while other schools
have over-identified poor and minority children as requiring special
education under the emotional disturbance label.129 Some children
struggling with emotional or behavioral deficits could also meet the
criteria for ADHD, in which case they would qualify for special edu-
cation under the disability classification of "other health impaired," a
catch all category of disabilities under the IDEA that explicitly in-
cludes ADHD.o30
Children with behavioral or emotional difficulties can still qualify
for special education services to address those needs, even without a
special education disability classification that is directly related to
those needs, such as emotional disturbance or other health impaired.
In fact, many children might be acting out or suffer from anxiety or
low self-esteem as a result of their school's failure to identify or ade-
quately address another disability, such as a learning disabilityl 31 or a
speech or language impairment.' 3 2 Despite the "widespread misun-
derstanding that only children who are labeled as 'emotionally dis-
turbed' are entitled to mental health services in the school setting,"
under special education requirements, if a child requires counseling or
other mental health services in order to make educational progress,
128. Id. § 300.8(c)(4)(ii).
129. Joseph B. Tulman, Disability and Delinquency: How Failures to Identify, Accommodate,
and Serve Youth with Education-Related Disabilities Leads to Their Disproportionate Representa-
tion in the Delinquency System, 3 WHirTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADvoc. 3, 31 (2003).
130. 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(9).
131. "Specific learning disability" is one of the enumerated special education disability classi-
fications, and it includes any disorder in one or more basic psychological processes involved in
understanding or using written or spoken language that may manifest itself in the imperfect
ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, or do mathematical calculations. Id. § 300.8(b)(10).
132. "Speech or language impairment" is another one of the specified disability classifications
in the IDEA, defined in the regulations as a "communication disorder, such as stuttering, im-
paired articulation, a language impairment, or a voice impairment, that adversely affects a child's
educational performance." Id. § 300.8(b)(11).
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his service should be included on the IEP and provided.133 This mis-
understanding reflects a broader myth that special education services
flow from the child's special education label. 134 Instead, a child
should receive any services that he needs in order to make progress in
an educational setting, regardless of his diagnosis or label.13 5 Conse-
quently, special education students can receive services and accommo-
dations to address behavioral or emotional deficits regardless of their
disability classification. "[A] child may need positive behavioral inter-
ventions and supports or psychological counseling even though the
child is not identified as 'emotionally disturbed."'1 3 6
The failure to evaluate and identify children with disabilities can
contribute to the exacerbation of their mental health needs. When
children are not timely evaluated for special education and go without
the necessary special education services, they can experience aca-
demic failures, instability at home, and behavioral problems in
schools-all of which are more likely to lead to their entry into the
"school-to-prison pipeline" 37 and to their placement out of the home
in RTCs. School administrators have historically misused disciplinary
measures to suspend and expel students with disabilities at dispropor-
tionate rates and have increasingly criminalized misbehavior in school
through "zero tolerance" laws and policies.138
Once a child is evaluated and found eligible for special education,
the IDEA and its accompanying regulations provide for a variety of
mechanisms that can help to ensure that a child with emotional or
behavioral needs makes educational progress, contributing to his sta-
bility and ability to remain at home and in the community. The child's
133. Ellen A. Callegary, The IDEA's Promise Unfulfilled: A Second Look at Special Educa-
tion & Related Services for Children with Mental Health Needs After Garret F., 5 J. HEALTH
CARE L. & POL'Y 164, 181 (2002).
134. Id. at 181-82. The emotional disturbance label can also lead school officials to overlook
a learning disability or other disability that is driving behavioral problems, leaving that disability
unaddressed.
A child who has an unaddressed learning disability, hearing impairment, or other
education-related disability might develop over time a tendency to act out in school, as
well as at home. If teachers and school administrators convince parents to label the
child as emotionally disturbed without identifying and addressing the underlying learn-
ing problems, they might be condemning the child to a downward spiral.
Tulman, supra note 6, at 407.
135. Nothing in the IDEA requires that children even be classified by their disability, so long
as each child has one of the enumerated disabilities and needs special education and related
services as a result. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(4) (2006).
136. Tulman, supra note 6, at 406.
137. Julia C. Dimoff, The Inadequacy of the IDEA in Assessing Mental Health for Adolescents:
A Call for School-Based Mental Health, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 319, 321 (2003); Dean
Hill Rivkin, Decriminalizing Students with Disabilities, 54 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 909 (2010).
138. See Tulman, supra note 6, at 405.
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IEP can include specialized or individualized instruction taught by a
special education teacher, as well as related services that could pro-
vide support to a child with a mental health disorder. Related services
can include counseling services for the child or his parents (or both),
therapeutic recreation, psychological services, and social work services
in schools,139 all of which could provide support to a child with a
mental health disorder. Moreover, the goals in an IEP, which are de-
signed to meet the child's needs and enable him to be involved and
make progress in the general education curriculum whenever possible,
are "not limited to academic benefits, but also include behavioral and
emotional growth." 140 Consequently, an effective program that helps
a child reach well-designed, measurable goals can significantly con-
tribute to the development and stability of a child with mental health
needs.
There are elements built into the special education legal regime spe-
cifically aimed at addressing a child's behavioral problems in school in
a nonpunitive way. For example, an IEP should "consider the use of
positive behavioral interventions and supports, and other strategies, to
address that behavior,"141 which promote good behavior rather than
punish bad behavior. When a child exhibits behavioral problems, a
behavioral intervention plan or functional behavioral assessment can
be developed as part of the IEP that identifies the nature of those
problems, triggers for behavioral incidents, and effective positive be-
havioral interventions that should be used to curb the behavior.142
These interventions could include implementing strategies the child
and teacher can use to de-escalate the behavior (such as breathing
techniques), teaching a student new skills to replace the problem be-
haviors, developing social skills groups, or creating a reward system to
motivate the child toward positive behavior. When an appropriate
IEP is not developed for a child who qualifies for special education or
a school is not implementing a student's IEP, these violations of spe-
cial education law can result in emotional and behavioral problems in
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(26)(A).
140. Cnty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir.
1996) (discussing the goals of a seriously emotionally disturbed student).
141. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(3)(B)(i).
142. Id. § 1415(k)(1)(F)(i). The law specifically provides for a functional behavioral assess-
ment to be conducted and a behavioral intervention plan to be developed in certain situations
where a school proposes to suspend a child for more than ten days. For extensive information
on functional behavioral assessments, behavioral intervention plans, and positive behavioral in-
terventions generally, see PosITIVE BEHAVIORAL INTERVENTIONS AND SUPPORTS, www.pbis.org
(last visited Apr. 26, 2012). For a discussion of functional behavioral assessment and behavioral
intervention plans, see Julie K. Waterstone & Jane R. Wettach, School Discipline and Students
with Special Needs, in SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY, supra note 6, at 251-52.
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school and at home, as well as academic failures, all of which can lead
to a child's placement in an RTC.
Special education law specifically disfavors the placement of chil-
dren in institutions such as RTCs. The IDEA explicitly requires that
children be educated in an environment that maximizes the child's op-
portunities for interactions with nondisabled peers.14 3 This obligation
reflects the congressional preference for "inclusion" of special educa-
tion students in their regular classrooms and schools (also known as
"mainstreaming"), 14" based on a recognition that children with disa-
bilities can be more effectively educated when schools "hav[e] high
expectations for such children and ensur[e] their access to the general
education curriculum in the regular classroom, to the maximum extent
possible." 1 4 5 "Special classes, separate schooling, or other removal of
children with disabilities from the regular educational environment
occurs only if the nature or severity of the disability is such that educa-
tion in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily."1 46 Students should be educated in
the school that they would attend if they were not disabled unless the
IEP requires another arrangement for the child to receive a free ap-
propriate public education. 147
As some children will require instruction outside of the regular edu-
cation classroom or their neighborhood school to make educational
progress, public education agencies "must ensure that a continuum of
alternative placements is available to meet the needs of children with
disabilities."148 From least restrictive to most restrictive, this contin-
uum must include "instruction in regular classes, special classes, spe-
cial schools, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and
institutions."149 In determining which of these placements would be
most appropriate for a particular child, the IEP team should begin
with the first, least restrictive option, which is regular classes, before
moving down the list to more restrictive alternatives.150 Removal of
the child from the regular education setting should be avoided when-
ever possible and must be justified by a finding that the benefits of
inclusion in the regular education are "far outweighed by the benefits
143. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A).
144. Jane R. Wettach & Brenda Berlin, The IEP, in SPECIAL EDUCATION ADVOCACY, supra
note 6, at 149, 176.
145. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A).
146. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2011).
147. Id. § 300.116(c).
148. Id. § 300.115(a).
149. Id. § 300.115(b)(1).
150. Wettach & Berlin, supra note 144, at 177.
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gained from services which could not feasibly be provided in the non-
segregated setting."151 The law also intends for a child who is re-
moved from her regular neighborhood school to be placed in a school
in close proximity to her home. 152
Instruction in an RTC is an example of instruction in an institution
separate from not only the child's regular classroom, but also from the
child's school, home, and community. It also often involves a long-
term removal from the child's neighborhood school and commu-
nity,153 and placement in an environment that is far from the child's
home, in contradiction with the intentions of the IDEA. This type of
instruction is, in fact, the most restrictive possibility for special educa-
tion students contemplated under the law, and thus the most disfa-
vored. Under the IDEA, an RTC is too restrictive for almost all
children.154 If a child's right to appropriate educational services in the
least restrictive environment were enforced, she could almost always
remain in her home and out of residential treatment.
The IDEA and the regulations issued by the Department of Educa-
tion also emphasize the importance of coordination with agencies and
resources outside of school. For example, where a child receives so-
cial work services on his IEP, those services should include partner-
ships with parents and other individuals regarding problems that
affect a child's situation at home and in the community and the mobil-
ization of community resources outside of the school to enable the
child to learn as effectively as possible.155 Additionally, the statute
and regulations require coordination with other public agencies re-
garding the provision of services to teenagers preparing to make the
transition to adulthood.156 "Transition services can include specialized
instruction and related services designed to focus on the development
of employment skills, independent living skills, and self-advocacy
skills" and provide opportunities for connecting with other public
151. Roncker v. Walter, 700 F.2d 1058, 1063 (6th Cir. 1983).
152. 34 C.F.R. § 300.116(b)(3); see also Murray v. Montrose Cnty. Sch. Dist., 51 F.3d 921, 929
(10th Cir. 1995) ("[I]n deciding where the appropriate placement is, geographical proximity to
home is relevant, and the child should be placed as close to home as possible.").
153. See, e.g., D.C. OLMSTEAD COMMUNITY INTEGRATION INITIATIVE: ONE COMMUNITY FOR
ALL 30 (Apr. 2012), available at http:lldds.dc.goviDC/DDS/DDS%2OPublication%20Files/DDS
files/DDS%20Latest%20Headlines/Olmstead%20Community%20Integration%20Initiative.pdf
(reporting that the average length of stay for special education students placed by District of
Columbia Public Schools at RTCs is approximately twenty-four months).
154. Despite the recognition that they are the most restrictive form of special education place-
ment, courts have recognized that for some children, an RTC might be the least restrictive envi-
ronment appropriate to their needs. Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987, 992 (3d Cir. 1986).
155. 34 C.F.R. § 300.34(14).
156. Id. §§ 361.5(b)(55), 300.320(b), 300.321(b)(3).
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agencies.' 57 At least as early as the school year in which a student will
turn sixteen years old, transition services must be included in the
child's IEP and updated annually.158 When appropriate and with the
consent of the parent or child (when the child has reached the age of
majority), the school district must invite to the child's IEP meeting
other public agencies responsible for providing or funding a student's
transition services.159
When a school district fails to effectively coordinate with other
agencies to address the needs of a teenager nearing adulthood, the
child may go without critical services that would allow for his indepen-
dence as an adult and for his general stability and well-being. Despite
the clear intention that school systems coordinate with other public
agencies to provide transition services that could help achieve stability
and independence for a child with a mental health disability or other
disability, such coordination happens too rarely. The National Coun-
cil on Disability has reported to the U.S. Department of Education
that many children continue to leave school without appropriate tran-
sition services that could make it possible for them to access higher
education or meaningful employment. 160
Mary's school failed her in a number of ways by violating many of
IDEA's requirements and regulations. Although Mary was identified
as a student with specific learning disabilities under the IDEA and
had an IEP, she was not receiving all of the special education services
that she required. In addition, her school failed to identify all of her
disabilities, as she also met the qualifications for eligibility as a student
with emotional disturbance. Mary's anxiety and behavioral issues
were affecting her education. Although she only needed to exhibit
one of these characteristics to qualify as emotionally disturbed under
special education law, she was arguably exhibiting a number of the
relevant characteristics, such as an inability to build or maintain satis-
factory interpersonal relationships with her peers and teachers, inap-
propriate types of behavior or feelings under normal circumstances, a
general pervasive mood of unhappiness or depression, and a tendency
to develop physical symptoms or fears associated with personal or
157. Wettach & Berlin, supra note 144, at 181.
158. 34 C.F.R. § 300.320(b)(2). Transition services might also be required for students under
the age of sixteen, where state regulations set an earlier age or where the IEP determines these
services are needed. Wettach & Berlin, supra note 144, at 181.
159. 34 C.F.R. § 300.321(b)(3).
160. NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, OLMSTEAD: RECLAIMING INSTITUTIONALIZED LIVES
188 (2003) (abridged version), available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2003/pdf/
reclaimabridged.pdf.
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school problems.161 Without identification of her emotional distur-
bance, her IEP did not include goals aimed at addressing her social
and emotional deficits, but instead focused exclusively on her aca-
demic limitations resulting from her learning disabilities.
She also required counseling services to address the impact of her
emotional problems on her education, but this service was not incor-
porated into her IEP, and she went without this critical assistance,
which could have allowed her to stabilize and make academic pro-
gress. Instead, Mary's school placed her in an RTC, the most restric-
tive, segregated type of school setting. Rather than providing her with
positive behavioral interventions through an individualized behavioral
intervention plan, Mary's school treated her punitively, suspended her
repeatedly, and inappropriately funneled her into the school-to-prison
pipeline. Her school failed to coordinate with other agencies to en-
sure that she received necessary services that could assist her in transi-
tioning to adulthood. Mary's story illustrates how congressional
intentions for educational achievement, integration, independence
and positive outcomes for children with disabilities remain unrealized
for many children with mental health disorders.
C. The Health Care Legal Regime
[C]hildren with serious emotional disabilities are among the most
fragile members of our society; their medical needs frequently ex-
tend across a spectrum of service providers and state agencies.
Prompt, coordinated services that support a child's continuation in
the home can allow even the most disabled child a reasonable
chance at a happy, fulfilling life. Without such services a child may
face a stunted existence, eked out in the shadows and devoid of al-
most everything that gives meaning to the gift of life.162
The legal regime establishing the Medicaid system also serves to
protect the rights of children with mental health disorders to medi-
cally necessary community-based treatment. The federal Medicaid
Act provides relevant protections for children from low-income
households through its mandate of early and periodic screening, diag-
nostic, and treatment services (EPSDT), which requires participating
states to ensure that individuals under the age of twenty-one receive
all medically necessary health and mental services. 163 Violations of
161. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c)(4)(i)(B)-(D).
162. Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D. Mass. 2006).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(4)(B) (2006); Katie A. v. L.A. Cnty., 481 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir.
2007) ("Although states have the option of not providing certain 'optional' services listed in
§ 1396d(a) to other populations, they must provide all of the services listed in § 1396d(a) to
eligible children when such services are found to be medically necessary.").
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this extremely broad mandate often result in Medicaid-eligible chil-
dren going without the mental health services to which they are enti-
tled. Without medically necessary community-based services, a child's
needs can escalate to the point where he is viewed as unsafe at home
and school, resulting in placement in an RTC.16 4
The Medicaid program is "designed to enable states to furnish med-
ical assistance on behalf of dependent children, aged, blind, and dis-
abled people with insufficient means to meet the costs of medically
necessary services,"165 and aims to enable states to provide "rehabili-
tation and other services to help such families and individuals attain or
retain capability for independence or self-care."166 The program is
voluntary for states, but every state has elected to participate in order
to benefit from the portion of the costs of medical assistance that are
paid by the federal government, with the exact percentage of the pay-
ment dependent on state population.16 7
Once states elect to participate, they have to comply with the Medi-
caid statutory scheme and the regulations promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services.168 Each state submits a
detailed plan to the federal government setting forth how it intends to
comply with the relevant requirements. 169 States must show how they
will provide coverage of medically necessary services "with reasonable
promptness to all eligible individuals. "170 Medicaid regulations re-
quire participating states to provide all medically necessary services in
sufficient amount, duration, and scope to effectively address the con-
dition,171 and the regulations are liberally construed in favor of the
beneficiaries. 72 When doctors find that services are medically neces-
sary,173 the state must pay for those services and assure that payments
164. See, e.g., Rosie D., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23-24.
165. Land, supra note 11, at 293.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 1396-1 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006) (listing the federal medical assistance percentage for the
District of Columbia at seventy percent).
168. Land, supra note 11, at 294.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (2006 & Supp. III 2009).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(8) (2006).
171. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(b) (2011).
172. E.g., Visser v. Taylor, 756 F. Supp. 501, 507 (D. Kan. 1990) (citing Aitchison v. Berger,
404 F. Supp. 1137, 1149 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)).
173. S. REP. No. 89-904, pt. 1 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1986 ("[Tjhe physi-
cian is to be the key figure in determining utilization of the health services . . . ."); see also
Weaver v. Reagen, 886 F.2d 194, 200 (8th Cir. 1989); Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546, 550 (8th
Cir. 1980). But see Moore ex rel. Moore v. Reese, 637 F.3d 1220, 1257 (11th Cir. 2011) ("[B]oth
the treating physician and the state have roles to play in determining medical necessity. It is
accurate that Moore's treating physician is a key figure and initially determines what amount of
nursing services are medically necessary. Indeed, the GAPP [Grants Administration Policies
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are "sufficient to enlist enough providers so that care and services are
available under the plan at least to the extent that such care and ser-
vices are available to the general population in that geographic
area." 174
"To address the fact that more than 3.5 million children under five
were failing to receive medical assistance, the program was expanded
to include the Early Periodic Screening Diagnosis and Treatment Pro-
gram (EPSDT) in 1967."175 With this program, Congress envisioned
not only a system in which expenditures on children's health care were
reimbursed, "but also an aggressive search for early detection of child
health problems."176 EPSDT requires that up until the age of twenty-
one, Medicaid-eligible children must receive all "medically necessary
services" and "[s]uch other necessary health care . . . to correct or
ameliorate defects and physical and mental illness."177 These services
include comprehensive screenings at regular intervals to determine
whether the child has certain illnesses or conditions, including those
that are mental, and not just physical, in nature, and treatment for
conditions discovered during the screens.178 The screens must include
"a comprehensive health and developmental history (including assess-
ments of both physical and mental health development)." 7 9 States
must provide care, services, and treatment to correct or ameliorate
physical or mental illnesses, defects, and conditions discovered by
those screenings, "whether or not such services are covered under the
State plan." 80 Medicaid EPSDT covers such mental health services
as diagnostic evaluation and intervention, group therapy, individual
therapy, family counseling, case management, living skills training, in-
and Procedures Manual] plan pays heed to the salient principle that the treating physician
should assume 'the primary responsibility of determining what treatment should be made availa-
ble to his patients.' The GAPP Manual specifies that '[tihe primary care physician develops the
child's initial plan of care.' Nonetheless, a state may still review the medical necessity of the
amount of nursing care prescribed by the treating physician and make its own determination of
medical necessity." (citations omitted)).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(30)(A).
175. Land, supra note 11, at 293; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396a(a)(43),
1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396(r); Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1247 (7th Cir. 1974) (explaining that
the EPSDT provision developed from the growing need for adequate health care for needy
children).
176. Land, supra note 11, at 293 (citing Stanton, 504 F.2d at 1251). "EPSDT programs must
be brought to the recipients; the recipients will not ordinarily go to the programs until it is too
late to accomplish the congressional purpose." Stanton, 504 F.2d at 1251. "Through this amend-
ment, Congress intended to take aggressive steps to screen, diagnose and treat children with
health problems." Id. at 1249.
177. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396d(r)(5).
178. See id. § 1396d(r).
179. Id. § 1396d(r)(1)(B)(i).
180. Id. § 1396d(r)(5).
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home behavioral aides, enhanced behavioral support and supervision,
psychiatric rehabilitation, day treatment, mobile treatment, and crisis
intervention.1 8' Not only is the EPSDT mandate unequivocal and ro-
bust, the Medicaid state agency must provide an opportunity for an
administrative hearing when a child is denied a necessary service or
when the request for that service is not acted upon with reasonable
promptness.182
The provision of these services can serve to stabilize a child with a
mental health disorder and prevent her institutionalization. Medicaid
statutes, regulations, and policy have also evolved more recently to
explicitly encourage the provision of community-based services over
institutionalization.183 Medicaid also requires coordination among
181. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396d(a)(19), 1396n(g)(2); 42 C.F.R.
§ 440.230 (2010); Salazar v. District of Columbia, 954 F. Supp. 278, 303 (D.D.C. 1996).
182. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3).
183. The Medicaid program has evolved to favor community-based treatment over institution-
alization. Since 1981, Medicaid has provided funding for state-run home- and community-based
care through a waiver program. See Pub. L. No. 95-35, 95 Stat. 812 (1981) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Re-
spondents, Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), 1999 WL 149653,
at *20-21. The goal of the waiver program is to provide services in the community and avoid
hospitalization. Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and Com-
munity-Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 117, 125 (2001). The
Department of Health and Human Services "has a policy of encouraging States to take advan-
tage of the waiver program, and often approves more waiver slots than a State ultimately uses."
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra, at *25-26. More-
over, the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 was added to Medicaid. See Pub. L
No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982). It is more commonly referred to as the Katie Beckett provision
and gives states the option to cover non-institutionalized children with disabilities. U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNDERSTANDING MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY SERVICES:
A PRIMER 14 (2000); BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAw, AVOIDING CRUEL CHOICES: A
GUIDE FOR POLICYMAKERS AND FAMILY ORGANIZATIONS ON MEDICAID'S ROLE IN PREVENT-
ING CUSTODY RELINQUISHMENT, at app., at 20 tbl.1 (2002) (providing data on home- and
community-based waivers by state); Joseph Shapiro, Katie Beckett: Patient Turned Home-Care
Advocate, NPR (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=131145687
(detailing Katie Beckett's story). Before the provision, "if a child with disabilities lived at home,
the parents' income and resources were automatically counted (deemed) as available for medical
expenses. However, if the same child was institutionalized for 30 days or more, only the child's
own income and resources were counted." U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra.
This change greatly increased the likelihood that the child could qualify for Medicaid. Many
states now use this option, which requires three things: (1) the child must require the level of
care that would be provided in an institution; (2) it must be appropriate to provide care outside
the facility; and (3) the cost of care at home must not exceed the cost of institutionalized care.
Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 134, 96 Stat. 375 (1982). However, while waivers benefit children with
medical needs, they may not yet have had the same effect for children with mental health needs.
According to the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, "Unfortunately, while most states
have chosen to use options or waivers or both for children with serious medical needs, to date
very few employ either approach to serve children with mental or emotional disorders."
BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, TEAMING UP: USING THE IDEA AND MEDICAID TO
SECURE COMPREHENSIVE MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH 4 (2003).
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public agencies to ensure the provision of needed services. For exam-
ple, case-management services should aim to assist eligible individuals
in gaining access not only to medical services, but also to social, edu-
cational, and other services. 184 Public agencies are also required more
broadly to coordinate their efforts to provide medical services to poor
children.185
Impact litigation in several states reveals the failures of these legal
regimes to achieve their goals of providing children with medically
necessary mental health treatment. For example, Medicaid-eligible
children in Massachusetts with serious emotional disturbances sued
state officials and agencies claiming that they were not receiving the
evaluations and intensive home-based services to which they were en-
titled under Medicaid EPSDT.18 6 The district court determined that
the state's Medicaid plan did not comply with EPSDT because it
failed to provide the proper assessments and services for children with
emotional disturbance. 87 These problems resulted from a lack of co-
ordination among public agencies; no single state entity was author-
ized to oversee the program. This authority and coordination was
necessary to "(a) identify promptly a child suffering from a serious
emotional disturbance, (b) assess comprehensively the nature of the
child's disability, (c) develop an overarching treatment plan for the
child, and (d) oversee implementation of this plan." 88 The state also
failed to provide in-home behavioral services, leading to the place-
ment of many of these children in RTCs known to exacerbate their
symptoms.1 89 These in-home services were medically necessary for
184. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(g)(2).
185. 42 C.F.R. § 441.61(c) (2011); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvs., STATE MEDI-
CAID MANUAL, pt. 5, at 5-27 to 5-31 (2005), available at http://www.cms.gov/Manuals/PBM/item
detail.asp?filterType=none&filterByDID=-99&sortByDID=1&sortOrder=ascending&itemlD=
CMS021927 (describing requirements under EPSDT for coordination among various agencies).
186. Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 22 (D. Mass. 2006). John B. v. Menke addressed
similar claims in Tennessee. See generally Class Action Complaint, John B. v. Menke, No.
3:98-0168 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 25, 1998), available at http://www.povertylaw.org/poverty-law-li-
brary/case/52200/52228/52228a.pdf. As of 2007, children in Tennessee still were not receiving
appropriate mental health assessments. John B. v. Goetz, No. 3:98-0168, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
75457, at *42 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2007).
187. Rosie D., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23. Still under federal jurisdiction, Rosie D. has led to
legislative change. On August 20, 2008, the Massachusetts Governor signed into law An Act
Relative to Children's Mental Health, 2008 Mass. Acts ch. 321, available at http://www.malegisla-
ture.gov/Laws/SessionLaws/Acts/2008/Chapter321.
188. Rosie D., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
189. Id. at 23-24. Inappropriate placement in residential facilities and hospitals can also have
a detrimental impact on the child's mental health. Children may be frightened by these place-
ments or react poorly to the limited privacy and social pressures involved in residential treat-
ment. Bernard P. Perlmutter & Carolyn S. Salisbury, "Please Let Me Be Heard:" The Right of a
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children with emotional disturbances, and the state's failure to pro-
vide this option amounted to a violation of EPSDT.190
Similarly, in Emily Q. v. Bonta, the plaintiffs were children who
were entitled to receive mental health benefits through Medicaid. 191
All had severe mental health needs and were in institutional place-
ments, although they could have been treated within the commu-
nity.192 The plaintiffs alleged that the state failed to provide
therapeutic behavioral services (TBS), which involves a trained and
experienced staff person working with children and their families at
home on a one-on-one basis in order to allow children to remain out
of institutional settings.193 The court ordered the defendants to pro-
vide general information to the heads of Medicaid-eligible households
describing EPSDT's supplemental mental health services and the
means for accessing those services. 194 The court required the state to
provide TBS to Medicaid-eligible children when appropriate. 195 Both
cases reflect the intention that the families of children who are eligible
for EPSDT services be so informed and that those children are pro-
vided with access to mental health services in their homes and com-
munity through EPSDT to prevent their unnecessary
institutionalization.
Mary's pediatrician referred her for counseling, having determined
that this treatment was medically necessary for her. However, the
mental health agency charged with connecting her with a mental
health provider told her that it would be several months before Mary
could be squeezed in for an intake appointment and then turned her
away. In Mary's city, as in others, low Medicaid reimbursement rates
result in a shortage of children's mental health providers that accept
Medicaid.196 This response was a denial of Mary's rights under Medi-
caid EPSDT to a medically necessary service that would have helped
Florida Foster Child to Due Process Prior to Being Committed to a Long- Term, Locked Psychiat-
ric Institution, 25 NOVA L. REV. 725, 735 (2001).
190. Rosie D., 410 F. Supp. 2d at 23-24. The court ordered a remedial plan to address these
deficiencies. Rosie D. v. Romney, 474 F. Supp. 2d 238, 239-41 (D. Mass. 2007).
191. Emily Q. v. Bonta, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
192. Id. at 1080-81.
193. Id. at 1083.
194. Id. at 1098.
195. Id. at 1086-87.
196. See Land, supra note 11, at 298-99; Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1373-74; see also CHIL-
DREN'S LAW CTR., IMPROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA (2012) [hereinafter CHILDREN'S LAW CTR., IMPROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL
HEALTH SYSTEM] (advocating for higher Medicaid reimbursement rates in order to attract more




2012] THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME 1085
to ameliorate her condition and could have allowed her to remain in
the community.
D. The Juvenile Justice Legal Regime
Virtually every family member who participated in focus groups
discussed the myriad of problem behaviors exhibited by their chil-
dren before they were arrested and referred to juvenile court. Fam-
ilies described unaddressed learning problems and subsequent
social and behavioral problems, undiagnosed mental health needs,
experimentation with substance use, and engagement in risk and ill-
considered actions. . . . Youth described being scapegoated by
school personnel, rather than helped when they were having
problems. ...
Families discussed their frustration and sense of hopelessness
when told nothing could be done to help their child. Rather than
finding "No Wrong Door," they found "All Wrong Doors." 1 9 7
The federal statutory scheme 98 regulating juvenile delinquency
prevention and juvenile justice programs explicitly promotes commu-
nity-based mental health treatment and seeks to avoid confinement in
juvenile correction facilities and institutionalization in RTCs when-
ever possible. 199 The Juvenile Justice Delinquency Prevention Act,
197. MODELS FOR CHANGE, FAMILY INVOLVEMENT IN PENNSYLVANIA'S JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 9 (2009).
198. While this Article focuses on statutory and regulatory provisions, youth who are incarcer-
ated or otherwise considered "in state custody," including youth who are committed to an RTC
by a juvenile justice agency, may also have substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment similar to those of prisoners, which include the right to medical care. However, a
substantive due process right to mental health services has rarely been explicitly recognized.
Most of the jurisprudence on the substantive due process rights of individuals confined to an
institution has stemmed from the Supreme Court's decision in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S.
307 (1982). In the Third Circuit, a number of cases have cited a substantive due process right of
incarcerated individuals, including youth, to mental health services. In A.M. v. Luzerne County
Juvenile Detention Center, a youth named A.M. saw a doctor at the very beginning of his deten-
tion and was never again treated for his mental health needs. A.M. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile
Detention Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 2004). The court adopted a "deliberate indifference"
standard for determining when a facility had violated an inmate's or detainee's due process
rights and found that the medical staff was deliberately indifferent to A.M.'s mental health
needs. 372 F.3d at 584-85. In D.W v. Rogers, a case involving the civil commitment of a juve-
nile to a mental health facility, the Eleventh Circuit recognized a substantive due process right to
mental health treatment. 113 F.3d 1214, 1217, 1219 (11th Cir. 1997). However, both the First
and Fifth Circuits have expressed doubts about a Fourteenth Amendment right to treatment for
juveniles. Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983); Morales v. Turman, 562
F.2d 993, 998 (5th Cir. 1977).
199. The statute is structured as a funding statute, vesting enforcement of its provisions with
the Department of Justice. Although an analysis as to its enforceability is outside the scope of
this Article, it is unlikely that the statute is privately enforceable. See, e.g., Cruz v. Collazo, 84
F.R.D. 307 (D.P.R. 1979) (noting that although 42 U.S.C. § 5602 clearly evinces the intention to
implement the "least restrictive alternative" in regard to rehabilitation of juvenile delinquents,
there is no evidence that a private cause of action was created by Congress so as to give standing
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the leading federal statute governing state juvenile justice systems that
receive federal funding, requires states to meet certain requirements
that reflect these and other congressional intentions. 200 The statute
promotes the identification of youth with unmet mental health and
learning needs, including those struggling in school, with an explicit
intention of preventing unwarranted suspensions and expulsions and
disrupting the school-to-prison pipeline that entangles many children
with mental health disorders. 201 States are also required to promote
community-based mental health treatment as a means to prevent the
entry of children into the juvenile justice system. Specifically, states
must provide counseling, training, and mentoring programs to youth
who are at particularly high risk, including those residing in low-
income and high-crime areas and those experiencing educational fail-
ure. 2 0 2 State plans should include assistance for approaches designed
to strengthen families, including the involvement of extended family
members, through family counseling and other services. 203
The legislation also established an Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) within the Department of Jus-
tice. 204 Congress empowered the OJJDP to research and evaluate the
need for appropriate mental health services for youth at risk of in-
volvement, or already involved, with the juvenile justice system and
provide grants to promote the development of such services.205 Finan-
cial assistance from the federal agency is available for projects that
provide treatment to youth who are at risk of entry into the juvenile
justice system and to their families, as well as to juvenile offenders. 206
These programs should include services for youth with serious mental
health and emotional disturbances, 207 as well as counseling, training,
and mentoring to youth who are at highest risk of involvement in the
delinquency system, such as those who live in high-crime areas.208
to sue a state or state agencies for not complying with the statute). Many of these principles are
embodied in state laws and the need for community-based treatment or freedom from unneces-
sary confinement or institutionalization can be argued or decided in local or state delinquency
proceedings regarding an individual youth.
200. 42 U.S.C. § 5601 (2006).
201. See id. § 5651(a)(2)(A)-(F).
202. Id. § 5633(a)(9)(G).
203. Id. § 5633(a)(16).
204. More than two and a half years into the administration of President Barack Obama, he
has yet to nominate anyone to serve as administrator of OJJDP. For an explanation of the
impact of the President's failure to appoint a leader for this agency, see Editorial, Juvenile Justice
Adrift, L.A. TIMEs, July 6, 2011, at A10.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 5661(a)(1)(B)(vii), (c).
206. Id. § 5651(a)(1).
207. Id. § 5651(a)(2)(H).
208. Id. § 5651(a)(4).
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Despite the intention that children and families be provided with
services to prevent delinquency system involvement, many children
fall through the cracks without access to needed services and end up
in this punitive system. A high percentage of incarcerated youth suf-
fer from a mental health disorder.20 9 Most youth in the juvenile jus-
tice system qualify for at least one mental health diagnosis, and it is
not uncommon for eighty percent or more of youth involved with the
delinquency system to have a diagnosis of "conduct disorder." 210 As
many as one out of every five youths in the juvenile justice system has
serious mental health problems.211 Some of these children have
mental disorders that are undiagnosed, and the behaviors that led to
their criminal offenses are often manifestations of their illness.212
Others have received mental health assessments and have been diag-
nosed, but cannot obtain the treatment they need quickly enough to
stabilize and avoid involvement with the delinquency system.213
Sometimes, without the availability of needed mental health services,
a parent may call the police when his child is acting aggressively, out
of desperation, fear, or hope that the child will finally get the needed
attention and services.214 Children with mental health disorders, par-
ticularly those of color, are often suspended from school as a result of
disciplinary problems, a phenomenon that can lead to involvement in
the delinquency and criminal justice systems through what has be-
come known as the "school-to-prison pipeline." 215
209. Cichon, supra note 47, at 12; Marc A. Schindler, Mental Health Issues Facing Adolescents
in the Juvenile Justice System: Part I, AACAP NEWS, Jan.-Feb. 1999, at 10, 11. An Ohio Depart-
ment of Mental Health study found that 86% of incarcerated females suffered from significant
mental health symptomatology. OHIO TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. TO JUVENILE
OFFENDERS, OHIO DEP'T OF MENTAL HEALTH, FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Feb.
1998), available at http://60c839e46aa2b05f44a0545042a9813fl819b245.gripelements.com/what-
we-do/provide/forensic-services/task-force-on-juvenile-offenders.php. A Virginia study revealed
that 77% of children in secure detention homes have some type of emotional disorder. POLICY
DESIGN TEAM, MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF YOUTH IN VIRGINIA'S JUVENILE DETENTION CEN-
TERS 14-15 (1994), available at http://www.ncmhjj.com/resource-kit/pdfs/Prevalence/References/
MHNeedVirg.pdf.
210. See Schindler, supra note 209, at 11.
211. "[Some] estimates place the rate of serious emotional disturbance among youth in the
general population at 9 to 13 percent (much higher than the 0.5- to 5-percent range previously
used by State policymakers." Joseph J. Cocozza & Kathleen R. Skowyra, Youth with Mental
Health Disorders: Issues and Emerging Responses, in NATIONAL CENTER FOR MENTAL HEALTH
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 1, 4 (2000) (citation omitted). For a discussion and definition of a con-
duct disorder, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 93-99 (4th ed. 2000).
212. Leviton, supra note 20, at 24.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 24 & n.54.
215. Tulman, supra note 6, at 404-05.
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The delinquency system is simply not equipped to serve the high
number of youth in the juvenile justice system that have a diagnosable
mental health disorder.216 Once children have entered the juvenile
justice system, the federal statutory scheme requires that mental
health assessment and treatment must be provided. The reality is that
the mental health needs of many juvenile offenders go undetected and
untreated.217 Under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, states must have a plan in place for providing needed mental
health services to youth in the juvenile justice system and for targeting
those youth who are in greatest need of such services. 218 For incarcer-
ated youth, states must ensure that qualified mental health profession-
als conduct needed assessments and develop individualized treatment
and discharge plans that provide for mental health services.219 Youth
who are receiving psychotropic medications must be under the care of
a licensed mental health professional, and programs must be in place
to provide suicide-prevention services for incarcerated youth who will
re-enter their communities following incarceration. 220 Even an of-
fender who is considered immediately dangerous must receive an im-
mediate psychological evaluation and follow-up treatment. 221
Here and elsewhere, where the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act requires treatment, that treatment is to be broad and
comprehensive, and include medical, educational, special education,
social, psychological, and vocational services, corrective and preven-
tive guidance and training, and other rehabilitative services as
needed. 222 Children who have been committed as a result of federal
criminal activity must also be provided with necessary mental health
services, education, and medical care.223
Federal juvenile justice law also requires that states allow children
to remain in the community and out of incarceration and institutional-
ization whenever possible. The OJJDP is charged with promoting the
development of community-based projects and services intended to
allow juvenile offenders to stay in their home and to strengthen their
216. Land, supra note 11, at 328 (citing a number of studies that show the prevalence of
mental illness and unmet treatment needs among youth in the juvenile justice system).
217. Youth who receive immediate screenings upon entering the juvenile justice system are far
more likely to have their problems identified and treated. Screenings also help identify juveniles
who may benefit from "multisystemic therapy." SARAH HAMMOND, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES, MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS, 2007, at 6.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 5633(a)(7)(B)(iv) (2006).
219. Id. H§ 5633(a)(9)(S), 5651(a)(8), 5651(a)(16).
220. Id. §§ 5651(a)(16)(D), 5651(a)(21).
221. Id. § 5651(a)(24).
222. Id. § 5603(15).
223. 18 U.S.C. § 5039.
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families.224 At least seventy-five percent of funds available through
that program must be used for community-based alternatives to incar-
ceration and institutionalization in residential placements, including
home-based alternatives and a continuum of foster care or group
home alternatives.2 25 Those funds must also be used to develop com-
munity-based programs and services to work with parents and other
family members to strengthen families so that juveniles can remain in
their home.22 6 Programs must be in place to allow nonviolent offend-
ers to remain with their families as an alternative to incarceration or
institutionalization. 227 States must have a comprehensive and coordi-
nated system of services that preserves a child's placement with his
family or otherwise provides services in the least restrictive environ-
ment possible, while still maintaining public safety.228 If effectively
established, these programs would keep children at home in their
communities and out of restrictive RTCs whenever possible.
Federal law also serves to prevent unnecessary institutionalization
and confinement for juveniles who are accused of committing crimes
in violation of federal law. 2 29 Under this system, the magistrate judge
has a basic duty to release a juvenile to his parents unless detention is
required for safety or to ensure future appearances in court.230 If a
juvenile is to be detained prior to disposition, that detention should
occur in his home or community whenever possible.231 When commit-
ment is necessary, wherever possible, "the Attorney General shall
commit a juvenile to a foster home or community-based facility lo-
cated in or near his home community." 232 A "comprehensive and co-
ordinated system of services" must reflect congressional "goals of
preserving families and providing appropriate services in the least re-
strictive environment" possible.2 33
224. 42 U.S.C. § 5651(a)(5).
225. Id. § 5633(a)(9)(A).
226. Id. §§ 5633(a)(9)(B), (M).
227. Id. § 5633(a)(9)(F)(i).
228. Id. § 5603(19)(A).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 5035 ("Whenever possible, detention shall be in a foster home or community
based facility located in or near his home community."); id. § 5039 ("Whenever possible, the
Attorney General shall commit a juvenile to a foster home or community-based facility located
in or near his home community."); id. § 5031 (defining juvenile delinquency as "the violation of a
law of the United States committed by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would
have been a crime if committed by an adult").
230. Id. § 5034.
231. Id. § 5035.
232. Id. § 5039.
233. 42 U.S.C. § 5603(19)(A).
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Finally, federal law also embodies an explicit intention for juvenile
justice agencies to coordinate with other child-serving agencies re-
garding prevention programming, as well as the treatment of youth
who do become involved in the delinquency system. To receive
formula grants under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, states must submit a plan showing that the state is coordinating
preventative efforts with other child-serving agencies. For example,
state plans must provide for the coordination and maximum utiliza-
tion of related programs operated by private and public agencies, such
as education, special education, health and welfare programs. 234
States must also form an advisory group that includes representatives
of other public agencies concerned with delinquency prevention and
treatment.235 Recognizing that many offenders will also have involve-
ment with the child welfare system and that those youth require
mental health treatment to promote their stability and prevent recidi-
vism, the statute requires that states develop programs that provide
treatment to those juvenile offenders who have also been victims of
abuse and neglect and to their families. 236 The OJJDP is specifically
empowered to provide grants to states to develop "comprehensive ju-
venile justice and delinquency prevention projects that meet the needs
of juveniles through the collaboration of the many local service sys-
tems juveniles encounter." 237 These grants should be used to "de-
velop locally coordinated policies and programs among education,
juvenile justice, and social service agencies," 238 which could serve to
prevent confusion resulting from differing eligibility criteria and bu-
reaucratic buck-passing.
Despite the system's intention that children receive preventive
treatment in the community and remain out of detention and incarcer-
ation, many children with mental health disorders, like Mary, end up
in restrictive juvenile correction facilities or RTCs and stay there
longer than needed, awaiting the availability of community-based
mental health services. 239 A small percentage of youth are directed
into diversion programs, and most youth receive no services as they
234. Id. § 5633(a)(8).
235. Id. § 5633(a)(3)(A)(ii)(III); see also id. § 5633(a)(9)(C).
236. Id. § 5633(a)(9)(D).
237. Id. § 5651(a)(10).
238. Id. § 5651(a)(2)(G).
239. In the six months between January and June of 2003, as a result of the unavailability of
necessary mental health services in their communities, "nearly 15,000 incarcerated youth waited
for community mental health services" in juvenile detention facilities. U.S. HOUSE OF REPS.
COMM. ON GOV'T REFORM, SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS Div., INCARCERATION OF YOUTH WHO
ARE WAITING FOR COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, at ii
(2004); see also Scaparotti, supra note 36, at 194.
[Vol. 61:10491090
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
wait months for court appearances. 240 Community-based mental
health service options are lacking, resulting in the funneling of more
youth into the juvenile justice system.241 Successful programs are fre-
quently short-lived, as community-based programs are often not pri-
oritized in state funding, despite the intentions of the federal legal
regime. For example, the Maryland Case Management Advocacy
Project provided counseling and daily visits by caseworkers to 135
children and their families. In its first year, only twelve of those chil-
dren were rearrested. 242 Despite this high success rate, the program
was terminated. 243
Rather than promoting community-based programs, state juvenile
justice agencies and juvenile court judges frequently order that youth
requiring mental health treatment be placed in RTCs or correctional
facilities, 244 even though they are often very restrictive and not reha-
bilitative in nature. While juvenile detention centers and jails have
"become surrogate mental hospitals," 24 5 they are not equipped to ad-
dress mental health needs.246 These correctional facilities are not de-
signed as treatment facilities, do not offer the ongoing intensive
mental health treatment these youth require, and lack staff trained to
provide these youth the care they need. 2 4 7 Children like Mary end up
spending weeks, months, or even years in juvenile correction facilities
without necessary treatment or educational services. These facilities
are also overcrowded and perform initial screenings and assessments
quickly and "en mass," and sometimes staff "misinterpret symptoms
of illness and forcibly restrain, overmedicate, or beat youths." 248 In
California, a sixteen-year-old with diagnoses of bipolar disorder and
conduct disorder was placed in a juvenile detention center, where she
was regularly held in isolation and restrained with handcuffs.249 These
240. Stacey Gurian-Sherman, Back to the Future: Returning Treatment to Juvenile Justice, 15
CRIM. JUST. 30, 34 (2000).
241. See id. at 31, 34.
242. Id. at 36.
243. Id.
244. Cichon, supra note 47, at 22.
245. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 4; see also Leviton, supra note 20, at 24.
246. Cichon, supra note 47, at 12; POLICY DESIGN TEAM, supra note 209, at 18 ("Most secure
detention home staff do not have the training or professional support available to manage effec-
tively youth with severe or urgent mental health problems.").
247. The 2010 Survey of Youth in Residential Placement found that eighty-eight percent of
youth are in facilities where some or all counselors were not mental health professionals. AN-
DREA J. SEDLAK & KARLA S. MCPHERSON, OJJDP, YOUTH's NEEDS AND SERVICES: FINDINGS
FROM THE SURVEY OF YOUTH IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT 3 (2010).
248. Leviton, supra note 20, at 30.
249. SUE BURRELL & ALICE BUSSIERE, "DIFFICULT TO PLACE": YOUTH WITH MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS IN CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE 1 (2005).
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attempts to calm her simply exacerbated her mental health
problems. 250 With such counterproductive, punitive interventions and
without appropriate mental health treatment, an average of 17,000 in-
cidents of suicidal behavior occur in U.S. juvenile correction centers
each -year,251 providing further evidence of the inadequate mental
health care offered at these facilities. Seventy-five percent of juvenile
detention centers fail to meet even basic suicide prevention
guidelines. 252
Juvenile justice systems also fail to adequately address the mental
health needs of youth re-entering their communities, as the necessary
planning and provision of aftercare services rarely occurs. 253 Barriers
to addressing the mental health needs of youth in the delinquency sys-
tem in the community, in detention facilities, and after release from
detention facilities reflect the broader problems plaguing the chil-
dren's mental health system, including inadequate screening and as-
sessment; a dearth of training, staffing, and programs necessary to
deliver mental health services; the lack of funding and clear funding
streams to support mental health services; and confusion as to which
child-serving system is responsible for providing services to these
youth.254 Due to the difficulty of securing community-based mental
health services and, for some children, the perception that they cannot
safely live in an unsecured setting in the community, youth in the de-
linquency system with mental health disorders might be sent by the
state juvenile justice agency to correctional facilities or long-term
RTCs, where they will experience unnecessary institutionalization,
and after which they are highly likely to recidivate and end up back in
detention or another RTC. 255
Mary's situation is illustrative of the school-to-prison pipeline phe-
nomenon, as her unaddressed anger and difficulty relating to other
children led to her fighting at school and, ultimately, to her arrest and
detention in a juvenile correction facility. Despite her cries for help
and suicidal ideations, incarceration became the solution to Mary's
problems, without needed mental health services. While in a juvenile
250. Id. at 2. For juveniles with mental health disorders, detention can bring about "a height-
ened sense of trauma and acute feelings of depression, anxiety and the possibility of suicidal
behavior." HAMMOND, supra note 217, at 7.
251. Leviton, supra note 20, at 13.
252. COAL. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, HANDLE WITH CARE: SERVING THE MENTAL HEALTH
NEEDS OF YOUNG OFFENDERS 18 (2000).
253. Leviton, supra note 20, at 31.
254. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 7.
255. D.C. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ASS'N, THE UNMET PROMISE: THE UNTAPPED RESOURCE
OF MENTAL HEALTH TREATMENT FOR YOUTH IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter THE UNMET PROMISE].
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correction facility, Mary received no treatment and the juvenile justice
agency did not arrange for mental health services for her in the com-
munity upon discharge. Although the federal legal regime prioritizes
coordination with other systems, as was the case for Mary, state and
local juvenile justice agencies responsible for the "rehabilitation" of
youth offenders often fail to coordinate effectively with special educa-
tion, mental health, and health care agencies to ensure that adequate
educational services and community-based mental health services are
provided for youth involved with the delinquency system. Instead, de-
spite the explicit goals of the federal juvenile justice statutory scheme
to prevent recidivism through the provision of mental health services
to juvenile offenders, Mary received no treatment while in the juve-
nile detention facility, received no treatment in the community, was
needlessly confined in a RTC, and subsequently recidivated. If the
vision that Congress promoted in the development of the federal stat-
utory schemes were carried out, youth like Mary who have mental
health needs would receive timely community-based treatment, rather
than incarceration and segregation in RTCs.
E. The Disability Rights Legal Regime
The consequences of an erroneous commitment decision are more
tragic where children are involved. [C]hildhood is a particularly
vulnerable time of life and children erroneously institutionalized
during their formative years may bear the scars for the rest of their
lives. 256
In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) to provide states with a "clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 2 5 7 The ADA was designed to prevent discrimination in
employment and public services offered by both private and public
entities. 258 The statute seeks to further "equality of opportunity, full
participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency" for
individuals with disabilities.259 Furthermore, Title II of the ADA pro-
hibits discrimination by governmental entities against individuals with
disabilities, mandating that "no qualified individual with a disability
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
256. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 318 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627-28 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
257. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2006).
258. David Ferleger, The Constitutional Right to Community Services, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
763, 768 (2010).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8).
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be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a pub-
lic entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 260
Specifically, the ADA forbids discrimination in the form of unnec-
essary institutionalization in settings where individuals with disabili-
ties are unable to interact with nondisabled individuals, thereby
requiring integration into the broader community. Echoing § 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act, which proscribes discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities by programs receiving federal financial assis-
tance,261 the ADA also requires that recipients of federal funds
provide services and programs to disabled individuals in the "most
integrated setting appropriate to the needs" of the individuals.262 Its
prohibition on discrimination covers programs and activities provided
by a public entity, requiring that they be administered in a setting that
enables individuals with disabilities to interact with nondisabled per-
sons as much as possible.263 For example, Title II of the ADA re-
quires that public schools provide reasonable accommodations in all
aspects of educational programming so that children can remain in
integrated school settings, including access to particular services and
areas of the school.264
The ADA also explicitly recognizes institutionalization as a form of
segregation and discrimination against people with disabilities,265 and
it requires that public entities refrain from engaging in discrimination
in the form of unjustified segregation. 266 In order to comply with the
ADA, public entities must make reasonable modifications to policies,
practices, and procedures to ensure that individuals can access the ser-
vices they need in their own communities, unless they can prove that
260. Id. § 12132.
261. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 also prohibits discrimination against per-
sons with disabilities by programs or activities receiving federal funds. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) ("No
otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of
her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial
assistance . . . .").
262. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2011).
263. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d); see also BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MAKING
YOUR LIFE YOUR OwN: How OLMSTEAD EXPANDS RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR PEOPLE
WITH SERIOUS MENTAL ILLNESSES 1 (2011), available at http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?
fileticket=HZT-J9kSCZk%3d&tabid=118 [hereinafter MAKING YOUR LIFE YOUR OWN] (ex-
plaining that the integration mandate requires that publicly funded services refrain from need-
lessly segregating persons with disabilities by keeping them away from the mainstream
community).
264. LAURA ROTHSTEIN & Scorr F. JOHNSON, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 36-37 (4th ed.
2010).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3); see also Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 600
(1999).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
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the provision of community-based services would fundamentally
change the nature of the program or result in undue burden.267
Both the integration and reasonable-modification provisions of Ti-
tle II of the ADA aim to prevent the discrimination of individuals
with disabilities through isolation,268 and they can be used to chal-
lenge the unwarranted institutionalization of children with mental dis-
abilities in RTCs. The standard for determining whether
institutionalization constitutes discrimination under Title II of the
ADA was announced by the Supreme Court in 1999 in the landmark
case Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring. In Olmstead, two women with
intellectual disabilities and mental health disorders filed suit in federal
court claiming that their continued confinement in an institution, after
it was determined that they were able to function in a community-
based program, was a violation of the ADA and their constitutional
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.269 Although the Court declined to rule on the constitutional
claims, the majority opinion, written by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that
unjustified isolation constitutes discrimination based on disability and
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on their claims under Title II of the
ADA.270
The Court looked to Congress's intention in enacting the ADA to
eliminate the historical segregation and isolation of people with disa-
267. Id. § 12182(2)(A).
268. See Ferleger, supra note 258, at 769; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(2)(A)(ii).
269. 527 U.S. at 588.
270. Id. In addition to protections provided under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the
ADA, children involuntarily placed in RTCs by public agencies may also be entitled to constitu-
tional protections under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Parham v.
J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (1979) (noting that a child retains a constitutional liberty interest through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from unwarranted and ineffec-
tive treatments); Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 316 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Children,
too, have a core liberty interest in remaining free from institutional confinement. In this respect,
a child's constitutional '[f]reedom from bodily restraint' is no narrower than an adult's." (altera-
tion in original)). Although the Supreme Court found in Parham v. J.R. that "a child has a
protectible interest . . . in being free from unnecessary bodily restraints," it declined to provide
extensive due process protections to a child whose parent committed him or her to a state
mental institution, relying heavily on parental autonomy in allowing for parents to commit their
child against the child's will. 442 U.S. at 585, 601. The Court explained that the determination of
a doctor employed by that facility as to the need for treatment would protect a child from the
"risk of error inherent in the parental decision to have a child institutionalized for mental health
care." Id. at 606-08. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld the broad authority of
parents over their children in R.J.D. v. Vaughan Clinic and further asserted that "health care
providers should be able to rely on a parent's consent when admitting a minor child into their
care." 572 So. 2d 1225, 1228 (Ala. 1990) (holding that the mere fact that the plaintiff did not
consent to the placement does not abrogate the mother's authority over custody and care of the
plaintiff and that it is the parents' legal right to determine what is best for the child); see also
Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1414.
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bilities through intentional exclusion and failures to modify existing
facilities and practices. 271 The Court reasoned that unjustified institu-
tional isolation is a form of discrimination because it perpetuates the
unwarranted assumption that people with disabilities must be isolated
from the remainder of society and are incapable of being productive
members of society. 272 Additionally, institutionalization diminishes
the everyday lives of individuals with disabilities by excluding them
from life activities such as family relations, social contacts, economic
independence, and educational advancement.273 Thus, unnecessary
institutionalization forces individuals with disabilities to relinquish
their right to a life in the community in order to receive treatment,
while those without disabilities can often receive medical services
without relinquishing any such right.274
Furthermore, the Court noted that Title II of the ADA "defines
'the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified indi-
viduals with disabilities' to 'mean a setting that enables individuals
with disabilities' to interact with nondisabled persons to the fullest ex-
tent possible." 275 Psychiatric hospitals and RTCs-where all of the
residents have mental health disorders and are denied interaction with
nondisabled individuals other than staff professionals-fall squarely
within the realm of settings that do not allow for integration into the
community. 276
271. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 588.
272. Id. at 600; see also Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1431.
273. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600; see also Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1431.
274. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 601; see also MAKING YOUR LIFE YOUR OWN, supra note 263, at 1
("[P]eople with disabilities should not have to move into group settings ... to obtain the services
they need to live and thrive in society like anyone else.").
275. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 592 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35 (1998)).
276. Note that Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination by public entities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 (2006). While many RTCs that house children are private entities, this Article discusses
the plight of children who are placed and funded by public agencies in these facilities. The ADA
would similarly prohibit discrimination through unwarranted institutionalization by public enti-
ties in placing and funding children in these private facilities. See id. § 12181(7). In Helen L. v.
DiDario, the Third Circuit applied the ADA to prohibit discrimination by states that used fed-
eral funds to institutionalize individuals with disabilities in private facilities. 46 F.3d 325, 338-39
(3d Cir. 1995). In that case, a 43-year-old woman was paralyzed from the waist down from
meningitis and placed in a Philadelphia nursing home. Id. at 328. The federal Medicaid program
and the state of Pennsylvania funded her nursing home placement despite the availability of an
alternative state program that would have allowed her to receive treatments at her home. Id. at
329. In ruling that the placement was a violation of Title II of the ADA, the court emphasized
that "recipients of federal funds may not engage" in discrimination on the basis of disability. Id.
at 334 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.4(b)(1)). Various public agencies, such as the juvenile justice, child
welfare, and education systems, are responsible for the administration of mental health services
to children, including residential placement. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA,
supra note 1, at 6. These agencies often utilize Medicaid dollars or other federal funds to finance
these mental health services. See, e.g., EMBRY HOWELL, URBAN INST., ACCESS TO CHILDREN'S
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The majority in Olmstead concluded that Title II of the ADA re-
quires states to place people with disabilities in community settings
rather than institutions when
the State's treatment professionals have determined that commu-
nity placement is appropriate, the transfer from institutional care to
a less restrictive setting is not opposed by the affected individual,
and the placement can be reasonably accommodated, taking into
account the resources available to the State and the needs of others
with mental disabilities.277
MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES UNDER MEDICAID AND SCHIP 1 (2004). Thus, these agencies are
subject to ADA prohibitions on discriminatory institutionalization because they are recipients of
federal funds. As in Helen L., the ADA would similarly apply to prohibit discrimination through
unwarranted institutionalization in these private facilities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7). Even
where federal funds are not used, if a public agency, such as a state or local child welfare, juve-
nile justice, or education agency, is placing a child with a disability in a private residential facility,
the ADA prohibits discrimination through unnecessary institutionalization. Id. § 12101(a)(3).
More recently, in Connecticut Officer of Protection & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v.
State of Connecticut, the district court dismissed the defendant's claim that three privately oper-
ated nursing homes did not fall under the purview of the ADA because they did not constitute
programs provided by a public entity. Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Plaintiffs'
Motion for Certification of Class at 11, 41, State of Conn. Office of Prot. and Advocacy for
Persons with Disabilities v. Connecticut, No. 3:06CV00179(AWT) (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2010) (de-
nying the defendant's motion to dismiss). The court rejected this contention based on the ADA
mandate requiring states to administer services in the most integrated setting to all qualified
individuals. Id. at 11-12. Both Olmstead and the ADA impose responsibility on the state to
provide community-based treatments, and therefore a state's unnecessary institutionalization in
private nursing facilities makes it liable under the ADA, whether or not the services are deliv-
ered by private entities. Id.
277. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. When the standard announced by the Court in Olmstead is
met for a particular child, that child should receive treatment in the community, rather than
placement in an RTC. Id. However, there is a question as to how a court would treat the second
prong, the requirement that transfer to a less restrictive setting not be opposed by the affected
individual. Because a parent may consent to the placement by a state agency of her child in an
RTC, over the objection of the child, it is not clear whether the court would look to the parent's
or the child's view of the institutionalization in determining whether that second prong was satis-
fied. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 585 (1979). The deference of courts to parental decisions
in committing their children to institutions suggests that a court might look to the parent and not
the child to determine consent to transfer to a less restrictive setting. However, the ADA specif-
ically aims to protect the rights of individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b). The stat-
ute's focus on individual empowerment is explicitly reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to
include in the Olmstead standard a requirement that an individual not oppose his transfer to a
less restrictive setting. See 527 U.S. at 587. Although under common law, parents have the right
and duty to make decisions on behalf of their children, ignoring the view of the child, who is the
"affected" individual, in determining whether the transfer to a less restrictive setting is opposed,
contradicts the emphasis on the autonomy of individuals with disabilities in the ADA. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101(a)(8). Even if the application of this prong of Olmstead requires parental consent
before a child can be transferred to a less restrictive setting, a parent who initially opposed the
transfer of his child back to the community might agree to the transfer if community-based
treatment was in fact available. With the inability to secure access to necessary services, parents
may be more likely to oppose re-integration of their children. See Weithorn, supra note 36, at
1375. If parents were offered effective ways to help, stabilize, and support their children, they
could pursue their child's return to the home or community. Parents often initially agree to
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These requirements establish the case-by-case analysis for a determi-
nation as to whether Title II of the ADA requires states to provide an
individual with mental disabilities with community-based treat-
ment.2 7 8 While the ADA requires reasonable modification to prac-
tices and policies to further avoid discrimination, the Court
emphasized in laying out this standard that states may avoid modifica-
tions that would significantly alter the state's services and programs.279
Although the Court's rhetoric in the Olmstead decision evidenced
strong concern about the institutionalization of individuals with disa-
bilities, the institutionalization of children by public agencies in pri-
vate RTCs has not been explored comprehensively in this light and
remains a largely invisible problem. Perhaps the placement of chil-
dren with disabilities in these facilities is implicitly justified through
society's view of the protective parens patriae role of the state and of
parents,280 or perhaps the issue remains largely unexamined due to
the lack of research about the effectiveness of such treatments and the
failure to effectively monitor these placements. 281 When children are
out of sight in these facilities, they may also be out of mind, at least to
policymakers and scholars.28 2 Alternatively, the lack of focus on the
problem may reflect a reality that as a society, we feel more comforta-
ble trusting to professionals children of whom or for whom we are
scared, as our communities have not provided the mechanisms
through which these children can achieve health and stability in our
midst. For these reasons, and likely others, the placement of children
in RTCs has not been viewed with the same concern or association
residential treatment because they are left with no other choice and feel they must send their
children away in order for them to receive treatment. See M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F. Supp. 2d 1298,
1309 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that defendants' failure to provide disabled plaintiffs with the
appropriate services put them at direct risk for institutionalization because it forced the plaintiffs
to choose between receiving no services, staying in the community, and being institutionalized to
receive services, and therefore was a violation of the ADA).
278. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
279. Id. at 603; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATEMENT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE INTEGRATION MANDATE OF TITLE 11 OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISA-
BILITIEs ACT AND OLMSTEAD v. L.C 2 (2011), available at http://www.ada.gov/olmstead/q&a
olmstead.pdf (stressing that states can only be excused from modifications that would "funda-
mentally alter" the service system).
280. See Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1401-03 (discussing the parens patriae role of the state in
decision making aimed at the protection of children).
281. See UNIv. LEGAL SERVS., INC., supra note 56, at 10.
282. See, e.g., NAT'L DISABILITY RIGHTS NETWORK, A DECADE OF LITTLE PROGRESS IMPLE-
MENTING OLMSTEAD, 19 (2009), available at http://www.napas.org/images/Documents/Issues/
Community integration/NDRNDecadeofLittleProgressImplementing Olmstead.pdf
(demonstrating the out-of-sight phenomena through the unnecessarily long placement of a six-
teen-year-old girl in a residential facility due to the institution's failure to release her even when
she was no longer a risk).
1098 [Vol. 61:1049
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
with discrimination as the institutionalization of adults with
disabilities.
The promise of the ADA remains unfulfilled for many children who
are institutionalized in RTCs. In Eric L. v. Bird, for example, the
plaintiffs brought action on behalf of children in foster care and those
who had been removed from their home by the New Hampshire Divi-
sion of Children and Youth Services. 283 The claim asserted that the
defendants violated federal statutory law and the Constitution by fail-
ing to ensure that children were reunited with their families as soon as
possible and failing to provide the necessary services to protect chil-
dren from harm.284 Although the court did not affirm all of the allega-
tions, it allowed the claim that the defendant discriminated against a
subset of children with disabilities by "segregating them in institutions
which isolate them from non-disabled children, and by denying them
services and placement opportunities comparable to those available to
non-disabled children." 285 The court concluded that the claim could
not be dismissed because a question remained as to whether the state
was engaging in discrimination prohibited by § 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act and Title II of the ADA by placing children with disabilities
in institutions.286 The case ultimately led to a settlement agreement,
which the defendants failed to implement, resulting in the appoint-
ment of a special master.287
There are steps that states can take to reduce the institutionaliza-
tion of children with disabilities. In Olmstead, the Court suggested
that a state can comply with its responsibilities by developing a com-
prehensive plan "for placing qualified persons with mental disabilities
in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a reasonable
pace not controlled by the State's endeavors to keep its institutions
fully populated."288 The development of "Olmstead plans" was sup-
ported by President George W. Bush in an executive order enforcing
the implementation of the ADA in accordance with the Olmstead de-
cision.289 Although the Court's decision did not specifically indicate
283. 848 F. Supp. 303, 306 (D.N.H. 1994).
284. Id.
285. Id. at 313.
286. Id.; see, e.g., W.R. v. Conn. Dep't of Children & Families, No. 3:02CV429 (RNC), 2003
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5128, at *7-8 (D. Conn. Mar. 24, 2003) (denying the motion to dismiss with
regards to the ADA because the minors can recover damages under the ADA if the state's
actions were motivated by animus or ill will inspired by the minors' disabilities).
287. See Eric L. et al. v. Comm'r of the N.H. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 81-376-M,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17323, at *6-7 (D.N.H. Sept. 30, 2003).
288. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 606 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).




what would constitute a "comprehensive effectively working plan,"
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services issued a letter to
state Medicaid directors in 2000 providing guidance to the states re-
garding their creation of Olmstead plans.290
The letter indicated that plans must be created to provide services
to eligible individuals in community-based settings and that individu-
als with disabilities and their representatives must be provided an op-
portunity to participate in the development of such plans.291
Furthermore, the plans should address ways to correct unjustified in-
stitutionalization and ensure availability of community-based ser-
vices.292 Moreover, individuals and their families must be given the
opportunity to choose how to best meet the individual's needs,
whether through community programs or institutions.293 Lastly, the
plans must indicate steps toward quality improvement and support
throughout implementation.294
The ultimate goals of such plans are to remove all qualified persons
from unnecessary institutionalization, to allow them to return to their
communities with appropriate services, and to prevent future discrimi-
natory placements.295 The unnecessary placement of children with
mental health disorders in detention facilities, psychiatric hospitals,
and residential treatment facilities shows that the Olmstead planning
process could be more effectively used to de-institutionalize youth. 296
290. Letter/Guidance to State Medicaid Directors, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.
(Jan. 14, 2000), http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/add/otherpublications/olmstead.html#letter
[hereinafter Letter to State]; see also BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, MERGING Sys-
TEM OF CARE PRINCIPLES WITH CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: OLMSTEAD PLANNING FOR CHILDREN WITH
SERIOUS EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE 4 (Nov. 2001), http://www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspxfile
ticket=ZQNT7T3LABw%3d&tabid=104 [hereinafter MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE].
291. Letter to State, supra note 290.
292. See id.; see also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 279, at 7 ("The plan should include
commitments for each group of persons who are unnecessarily segregated . . . .").
293. See Letter to State, supra note 290; see also MAKING YOUR LIFE YOUR OWN, supra note
263, at 2 (emphasizing that people with disabilities have the right to elect where they receive
services).
294. Letter to State, supra note 290.
295. See Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1433; see also YOUTH VILLAGES, ALABAMA DEPART-
MENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES' ASSESSMENT OF SERIOUSLY EMOTIONALLY DISTURBED YOUTH
IN RESIDENTIAL AND THERAPEUTIC FOSTER CARE PLACEMENTS 2 (2004) (noting that many chil-
dren remain in inappropriate, restrictive long-term placements due to the lack of a full contin-
uum of care in their communities).
296. In 2001, shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Olmstead, the Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law issued a report on the progress of states in Olmstead planning regarding
children based on a review of Olmstead plans by the National Association of State Protection
and Advocacy Systems (NAPAS). MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE, supra note 290. Despite the
development and implementation of Olmstead plans in most states, the NAPAS review indicated
that minimal efforts had been made in using Olmstead plans for children and little consideration
had been given to children in residential facilities. See id. at 5. Although there have been re-
[Vol. 61:10491100
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
Litigation around the country reveals that the Olmstead mandate has
not yet been fully achieved regarding the provision of appropriate
community-based services for individuals with disabilities. 297 States
should include in their Olmstead plans steps they will take to reduce
the number of children needlessly placed in segregated settings by
public agencies. 298
Title II of the ADA and the Court's interpretation of the statute in
Olmstead can serve as effective legal avenues to protect children with
disabilities from unnecessary institutionalization. As described above,
unjustified residential placement is exactly the type of discrimination
against which the ADA aims to protect. Just like adults with disabili-
ties, children with disabilities are a vulnerable group with a history of
disproportionate treatment and segregation. 299 Rather than institu-
tionalizing Mary in an RTC, her school should have examined
whether such isolation and segregation were in fact warranted. The
educational agency should have carried out the intentions of Congress
in the ADA by prioritizing her continued placement in the commu-
nity, with the services necessary to make such continuing integration
possible. The effects of institutionalization on a child like Mary are
substantially detrimental to the development of the proper skills nec-
essary for her to become a functioning member of both the commu-
nity and her family.
IV. THE DISJUNCTION BETWEEN THE SHARED GOAL OF
COMMUNITY-BASED TREATMENT AND THE REALITY FOR
CHILDREN WITH MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS
The analysis of legal regimes related to child welfare, special educa-
tion, health care, juvenile justice, and disability rights reveals common
goals of early identification, prevention, the provision of community-
based services, and avoidance of out-of-home and congregate care
placements. Yet local and state agencies frequently fail to ensure that
children timely receive the mental health treatment they require and
continue to place children from low-income families in RTCs, to the
detriment of those children and at high cost to taxpayers. What are
views of state Olmstead plans since that time, no review has specifically focused on the extent to
which state plans address the needs of children. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABIUTY, supra note
160, at 5.
297. See, e.g., Statement of Interest of the United States at 13, Troupe v. Barbour, No.
3:10cv153HTW-LRA (S.D. Miss. Apr. 8, 2011), available at http://www.ada.gov/briefs/troupe-
interestcbr.pdf; see also Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1433.
298. See MERGING SYSTEM OF CARE, supra note 290.
299. Cf Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 127-28 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (describing abuse of treatment in a 1981 decision).
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the reasons for this disjunction between the goals of the relevant fed-
eral legal regimes and the continued institutionalization of poor chil-
dren with emotional and behavioral problems? The stigma
surrounding mental illness, the scarcity of providers, delays in gaining
access to community-based services, and compartmentalization among
child-serving public agencies contribute to this disconnect between the
"law on the books" and the reality for children.300
A. The Stigma of Mental Illness
Without effective community education and outreach by state agen-
cies, parents and children may go without necessary services due to
the stigma associated with mental illness and involvement in mental
health treatment.301 Stigma can lead to a failure to identify, diagnose,
and treat children's mental health needs, which can be particularly
problematic in communities of color and those without financial re-
sources,302 where a lack of education, outreach programs, and cultur-
ally competent mental health providers and materials exacerbates the
problem.303 A child and her parents may be hesitant to acknowledge
her emotional struggles or ask for help as a result of the stigma at-
tached to mental illness. Even the Supreme Court has acknowledged
the powerful effect of stigma on the individual, emphasizing that
"[o]ne who is suffering from a debilitating mental illness and in need
of treatment is neither wholly at liberty nor free of stigma." 304
300. See Larke Huang et al., Transforming Mental Health Care for Children and Their Fami-
lies, 60 Am. PSYCHOLOGIST 615, 620 (2005) (highlighting that multiple barriers, including stigma,
fragmentation of services, lack of availability, and cost, contribute to all populations not receiv-
ing appropriate services).
301. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 25; MENTAL
HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 180, 188; see also ERVING
GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 2-3 (1986).
302. See Leviton, supra note 20, at 19.
303. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 28. Stigma contrib-
utes directly to missed opportunities for prevention and early identification. Id. at 15. "Cultural
competence is the ability to work effectively and sensitively within various cultural contexts,"
including the "ability to honor and respect the beliefs, language, interpersonal styles, and behav-
iors of individuals and families receiving services, as well as staff who are providing such ser-
vices." Cultural Competence in Mental Health Care, NAT'L ALLIANCE ON MENTAL ILLNESS,
http://www.nami.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Find-Support/MulticulturalSupport/Cultural
Competence/CulturalCompetence.htm (last visited Sept. 17, 2011) ("For consumers of color,
access to mental health services and the quality of the services they receive are negatively af-
fected by the lack of cultural competence in service delivery. Many research studies have shown
that because of the lack of cultural competence, people of color may not seek services in the
formal system, cannot access treatment, drop out of care, are misdiagnosed, or seek care only
when their illness is at an advanced stage.").
304. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429 (1979).
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In addition to its effects on the individual with a mental health dis-
order, stigma can also leave families feeling at fault for their child's
mental health problems.305 "Parents are fearful about bringing the so-
cial and emotional difficulties of their children to the attention of
medical professionals, perhaps afraid they may be blamed."30 6 This
fear can be compounded for low-income parents, who may be more
likely to feel disrespected or misunderstood by health care provid-
ers.30 7 Many parents do not recognize the necessity of mental health
services, "linking use of services to a lack of toughness."308 Some par-
ents may have themselves experienced trauma or abuse and feel that
they survived without mental health services and that their children
should be able to do the same.309 Teachers, public agency officials,
courts, attorneys, mental health professionals, and others sometimes
contribute to the problem of stigma by demonizing children and paint-
ing them as violent superpredators.310 Discussions in courtrooms and
evaluation reports sometimes paint a picture of a dangerous villain,
rather than reflecting images of a child who has suffered trauma or a
child with a disability who is crying out for help.
The stigma associated with mental illness may have prevented
Mary's foster mother from meaningfully connecting Mary's behaviors
with a mental health need. Frustrated by Mary's behavior, embar-
rassed by the chatter in the neighborhood that Mary was "crazy," and
lacking access to information about mental health disorders and the
available types of treatment, her foster mother was not empowered to
advocate for services that could have helped both her and Mary to
achieve stability. The various child-serving agencies that were in-
volved in the lives of Mary and her foster mother failed to help them
understand her diagnoses and potential treatments, leaving the stigma
associated with mental health disorders-as well as the stigma associ-
ated with being a victim of rape-unaddressed.
305. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 30.
306. Id. at 15.
307. Id. at 30.
308. ANITA CHANDRA ET AL., HEALTH AND HEALTH CARE AMONG DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
YouTH 112 (2009), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical-reports/
2009/RANDTR751.pdf.
309. Id. Children also can be directly stigmatized by their classmates. MENTAL HEALTH: A
NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 15.
310. See, e.g., PETER ELIKANN, SUPERPREDATORS: THE DEMONIZATION OF OUR CHILDREN
BY THE LAW (1999).
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B. Scarcity of Providers and Delays in Receiving Services
While the mental health needs of many children go unidentified al-
together, those children who are identified and referred for mental
health services still often face significant barriers to actual receipt of
those services, including lack of available specialists, insurance restric-
tions, and appointment delays. A low-income family seeking a mental
health service may find a long wait to gain access to that service,31' or
may find that the service is not available to low-income individuals
covered by Medicaid or not available in the geographic region whatso-
ever.312 Finding a provider can be especially difficult if the child does
not have insurance or if the child's insurance does not provide for
extensive mental health coverage.313 Even for children covered by
Medicaid, some Medicaid managed care organizations, for example,
will only authorize a limited number of visits for treatment that is
often insufficient to meet a child's mental health needs.314 In part be-
cause Medicaid reimbursements are sometimes too low for mental
health providers to remain economically viable, there are often few
providers in a given Medicaid network available to provide intensive
mental health care. 315 Moreover, parents do not have ready access to
case-management services that can help them navigate various bu-
reaucratic hurdles to obtain needed care.316
Delays in gaining access to services contribute significantly to the
failure of children to receive needed community-based mental health
treatment. More than two thirds of primary care physicians who refer
children for mental health services report appointment delays, with
311. For example, a Children's National Medical Center psychiatrist testified before the Dis-
trict of Columbia City Council that there is a ten-week wait for a child served by Medicaid to see
a psychiatrist at the hospital's outpatient clinic. Budget Cuts Mean Shrinking Access to Mental
Health Services for DC's Children, D.C. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH Ass'N (June 6,2011), http://www.
dcfpi.org/budget-cuts-mean-shrinking-access-to-mental-health-services-for-dc%e2%80%99s-
children#respond.
312. In the District of Columbia, for example, because Medicaid reimbursement rates for
mental health services are often very low and the process of obtaining reimbursement can in-
volve significant bureaucratic obstacles, many mental health providers choose not to accept
Medicaid insurance, meaning that some mental health services simply are not available in the
city at all. Id.
313. CHANDRA ET AL., supra note 308, at 112.
314. Id.; see also MAKING SENSE OF MEDICAID, supra note 23, at 15 ("Most managed health
care plans, such as HMOs, contract to provide only a short-term acute mental health benefit.
However, the state remains responsible under the law for providing care to children who have
serious disorders and who require services the HMO does not provide. States should inform
families of their child's right to all medically necessary services, but few provide clear explana-
tions. As a result, families, unaware that their child has such a right, do not know how to claim
additional services if the HMO benefit is inadequate.").
315. See MAKING SENSE OF MEDICAID, supra note 23, at 15.
316. CHANDRA ET AL., supra note 308, at 112.
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average wait time for an appointment with a specialist being three to
four months.3 1 7 If a referral is not made for a child to receive spe-
cialty mental health services until that child is already "spiraling out of
control," a delay of several weeks is too long to wait.3 18 As in Mary's
situation, when a child who is in crisis must wait for mental health
services, the child's stability, and even his safety or life, could be at
risk.
Designing and implementing a strong community-based mental
health treatment plan for a child presenting with such complex needs
is sometimes more difficult than sending the child away, where he will
no longer be stressing and stretching the capacities of his family,
school, neighborhood, or public agencies. In describing the phenome-
non of a failed community-based mental health system in the District
of Columbia and the resulting high rates of RTC placement, a city
administrator explained, "The issue is lazy bureaucracy.. . . It's much
more difficult to design a detailed wraparound plan than it is just to
stick a youth in a facility."319 A city juvenile justice agency worker
reported that caseworkers simply turn to residential treatment place-
ments "because they run out of ideas. I don't think they know how to
create a plan to help a young person . . . so they resort to the most
extreme measure. You are talking about taking away their liberty to
help them." 320
C. Compartmentalization and Fragmentation Among
Child-Serving Agencies
The limited mental health services that are available for children
from low-income families are often funded by a number of public
317. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 19.
Of those patients who were referred, 59% had zero visits to the specialist; only 13%
averaged one or more visits a month in the follow-up period of six months. In short, an
increasing number of problems (15-30%) are being identified by primary care provid-
ers, but rates of recognition (48-57%) are still low and connections to mental health
specialists are difficult.
Id.
Eighty-five percent of "drop-out rates" for mental health services can be attributed to opera-
tional failures, such as delays in the provision of services. NAT'L COUNCIL FOR CMTY. BEHAV-
IORAL HEALTH CARE, ENHANCED ACCESS AND ENGAGEMENT QUALITY IMPROVEMENT
INITIATIVE: STRATEGIES TO INCREASE THERAPY ADHERENCE 1 (2010), available at http://www.
thenationalcouncil.org/galleries/policy-file/EnhancedAccessReport%20FINAL.pdf.
318. THE UNMET PROMISE, supra note 255, at 5.
319. Jason Cherkis, Outsourcing Troubled Kids, WASH. CITY PAPER (Jan. 7, 2011), http://
www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/40237/outsourcing-troubled-dc-kids/full (quoting a for-
mer District of Columbia administrator).
320. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting a Department of Youth Rehabilitation Services
official).
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agencies, meaning that responsibility for mental health care is dis-
persed among multiple settings,321 particularly for low-income chil-
dren with mental health disorders.322 While these children often have
several public agencies involved in their lives because they present
with multiple problems, 323 those agencies rarely work together.324
This fragmentation is evident in the differing entry points, eligibility
criteria, financial structures, service offerings, service delivery struc-
tures, and procedures that a family must navigate to secure treatment
through various child-serving agencies. 325 "There are a plethora of
programs, laws, regulations, federal and state mandates, but many
have conflicting or rigid rules .. . and arbitrary eligibility requirements
. ... "326 For example, the requirement by some agencies that a child
321. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 14.
322. See Cichon, supra note 47, at 9.
323. Cichon, supra note 47.
324. STROUL, supra note 27; see also BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, STILL WAIT-
ING, supra note 25, at 9 ("Several federal agencies are key [in implementing the Olmstead deci-
sion], including HUD, the Justice Department, the Education Department, the Department of
Health and Human Services and its agencies (among them SAMHSA and the Administration on
Children, Youth and Families), Social Security Administration and CMS.").
325. For example, in the District of Columbia, this fragmentation is evident at a number of
levels. Medicaid-eligible children are provided services through two funding mechanisms-
Medicaid managed care organizations (MCO) or Medicaid fee-for-services for children in the
custody of the foster care or juvenile justice systems. D.C. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AsS'N, To-
WARDS A TRUE SYSTEM OF CARE: IMPROVING CHILDREN'S BEHAVIORAL HEALTH SERVICES IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA (PART 1 OF 2), at 3, 8 (2009), available at http://www.dcbehavioral
health.org. Although MCOs are responsible for the delivery of services, the burden shifts to the
Department of Mental Health if the child has severe mental health issues. Id. at 5. However,
MCOs are still responsible for delivering developmental services and schools remain responsible
for early intervention services. Id. at 10. Both MCOs and fee-for-service Medicaid diffuse the
responsibility over various local agencies, resulting in confusion for both parents and providers
regarding the acceptance of services through the different Medicaid systems. CHILDREN's LAW
CTR., IMPROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 196, at 19. Further-
more, different MCOs might have varying requirements for eligibility criteria for different ser-
vices, or may not even have any providers within network that provide the necessary service.
D.C. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH Ass'N, supra, at 8. With different entry points for mental health
service provision through the local school, child welfare, juvenile justice, mental health, and
health care agencies, "there are many payment structures and providers, and often parents are
unable to find anyone who has an accurate and comprehensive understanding of all the service
and treatment options available for their child.... A child's condition deteriorates during the
time the family waits to find appropriate, consistent treatment." CHILDREN'S LAW CTR., IM-
PROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM, supra note 196, at 19. Many children do
not receive needed services due to this complexity and fragmentation of the system. CHIL-
DREN'S LAW CTR., MEDICAID AND CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 13, 19 (2011), available at http://www.childrenslawcenter.org/sites/default/files/clc/
Medicaid%20Mental%20Health%20101.pdf. For a discussion of some of the problems plaguing
the children's mental health system in the District of Columbia, see D.C. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH
Ass'N, supra; CHILDREN'S LAW CTR., MEDICAID AND CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH CARE,
supra.
326. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL ACTION AGENDA, supra note 1, at 18.
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have a diagnosis that falls into a particular category makes it difficult
for a child to receive immediate services if she has not yet been as-
sessed or diagnosed with a specific disorder. Delays in obtaining
needed assessments can mean that a child in crisis could wait months
or longer before receiving an evaluation that would provide her with
the necessary diagnosis.327 In the end, if a parent cannot produce the
necessary documentation to satisfy relevant eligibility criteria, an
agency might be altogether precluded from serving the child or
family.328
Sometimes a public agency asserts that services should be provided
by other agencies, rather than coordinating efforts with those agencies
to ensure that children get the services they require. 329 In order to
save limited resources, the agency-which is likely understaffed and
underfunded-might disclaim responsibility for providing the needed
care and attempt to shift the responsibility to another agency.330
When a child is referred from the first agency to a second, the second
agency could also respond similarly, referring the family to yet an-
other agency.331 Mary encountered this responsibility shifting. Such
buck-passing shows that "the public mental health system for children
is anything but a 'system." 332
327. See, e.g., CHILDREN'S LAW CTR., IMPROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM,
supra note 196, at 17 (recommending that the District of Columbia ensure that children who are
in crisis have access to mental health services quickly without first requiring that children receive
a specific type of diagnosis through a lengthy evaluation process); Budget Cuts Mean Shrinking
Access to Mental Health Services for D.C.'s Children, supra note 311 (describing the average ten-
week delay to receive an initial psychiatric evaluation appointment at one of the largest Medi-
caid psychiatric providers in D.C.).
328. See Cichon, supra note 47, at 10.
329. Land, supra note 11, at 281; see also Rebecca A. Clay, Coordinating Care for Children
with Serious Mental Heal Challenges, SAMHSA NEWS, July-Aug. 2009, at 1, 2, available at http://
www.samhsa.gov/samhsanewsletter/Volume_17_Number_4/CoordinatingCare.aspx ("The differ-
ent child-serving systems, such as child welfare, juvenile justice, and education, need to speak to
each other .... ) (quoting Gary M. Blau, Chief of the Child, Adolescent, and Family Branch at
Community Mental Health Services).
330. Cichon, supra note 47, at 10; see also Leviton, supra note 20, at 19. The United States
General Accounting Office has reported on coordination issues between special education and
Medicaid systems at federal, state, and local levels, indicating coordination challenges in "deter-
mining which IDEA-related services Medicaid will cover, identifying children who are eligible
for both programs, and managing the documentation required for submitting Medicaid claims."
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID AND SPECIAL EDUCATION: COORDINATION OF SER-
VICES FOR CHILDREN WITH DISABILITIEs Is EVOLVING 3 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/he00020.pdf.
331. Cichon, supra note 47, at 571; see, e.g., Huang et al., supra note 300, at 622 ("The confu-
sion that results from the involvement of so many agencies creates often insurmountable sys-
temic barriers to effective and comprehensive service delivery.").
332. Cichon, supra note 47.
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Confusion at both the policy and practice levels as to which agency
is responsible for providing services to a particular child, especially
when delivery of multiple services is needed, can provide a significant
barrier to addressing the needs of children with mental health disor-
ders. 33 3 When an agency does fifially accept responsibility for serving
a child, it may not have the resources or expertise to serve the child
and family with the full array of required services,334 or there may be
significant delays in the provision of the necessary services.335 It fre-
quently is so difficult to timely gain access to the range of needed
services that many children go without needed services.336
In Mary's case, the child welfare, health care, juvenile justice, and
special education systems all failed individually to meet her needs or
coordinate and communicate among each other and instead passed
the buck to one another.337 Her situation illustrates the fragmenta-
tion, compartmentalization, and lack of coordination that plagues the
children's mental health system as agencies try to separate responsibil-
ity and point the finger at one another. As one federal judge opined:
It may be possible in some situations to ascertain and determine
whether the social, emotional, medical, or educational problems are
dominant and to assign responsibility for placement and treatment
to the agency operating in the area of that problem. In this case, all
333. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 7. Even courts have struggled to determine
which legal system has responsibility for certain types of mental health treatment for youth. See,
e.g., Cnty. of San Diego v. Cal. Special Educ. Hearing Office, 93 F.3d 1458, 1468 (9th Cir. 1996)
(discussing legal standards set by courts for determining whether the special education system or
mental health system is responsible for funding the cost of a child's residential treatment
program).
334. Cichon, supra note 47, at 10.
335. CHILDREN's LAW CTR., IMPROVING THE CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 196,
at 35 (highlighting that, despite District of Columbia regulations requiring mental health agen-
cies to provide services within seven days of a referral, only 26% of children in the community
actually receive services within seven days and only 50% within a month).
336. Leviton, supra note 20, at 17.
337. This phenomenon of buck-passing is illustrated in North v. District of Columbia Board of
Education, 471 F. Supp. 136, 139-41 (D.D.C. 1979). In that case, the defendant argued that the
emotional well-being of a child with significant health problems, as well as emotional distur-
bance, was the responsibility of the D.C. Department of Human Resources and that it ade-
quately discharged its duty to provide educational services with a school placement, even though
the child could not be stable with that placement. Id. at 139. The defendant argued that it
"should not be saddled with the responsibility of providing him with living arrangements not
strictly of an educational nature" and argued this was the responsibility of social services agen-
cies. Id. at 140. Instead, the D.C. Board of Education urged the parents to resort to commit-
ment schemes "pertaining to children who are delinquent, neglected, or in need of supervision."
Id. In response, the Court expressed concern that two agencies of the District of Columbia that
have responsibility to care for the child were "seeking to shift the responsibility to each other."
Id. at 141. The Court explained, "Presently, in many States, responsibility is divided, depending
upon the age of the handicapped child, sources of funding, and type of services delivered. . ..
[T]he responsibility must remain in a central agency ..... Id. at 139.
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of these needs are so intimately intertwined that realistically it is not
possible for the Court to perform the Solomon-like task of separat-
ing them.338
Because the local and state agencies responsible for providing ser-
vices to children frequently do not coordinate with one another, they
often fail to comply with their clear federal statutory and regulatory
mandates. 339
V. COORDINATION AMONG PUBLIC AGENCIES TOWARD THE
PROVISION OF EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES TO
CHILDREN WITH MENTAL HEALTH DISORDERS
Various federal legal regimes have intersecting goals of providing
children with mental health disorders treatment in the community and
preventing their institutionalization. Research developments in other
disciplines, such as health policy, psychiatry, psychology, and social
work, provide the tools needed for the realization of this shared vi-
sion. First, researchers with the National Institute of Mental Health
developed a framework for the delivery of children's mental health
services that can help agencies overcome fragmentation and achieve
meaningful collaboration to maintain the placement of children in the
least restrictive environment. Known as the "system of care" ap-
proach to children's mental health, this service-delivery model re-
quires coordination among stakeholder agencies, as well as policies
and structures that support family-centered, holistic case management
and treatment.340
In addition to using this coordinated approach, public agencies can
make it possible for children to achieve stability and mental health in
their communities without institutionalization by offering children and
families services that are grounded in research that supports their effi-
cacy. "Evidence-based practices" to mental health treatment are stan-
dardized services that have been researched through controlled
studies showing that they achieve positive outcomes for children.341
338. North, 471 F. Supp. at 141; see also Kruelle v. New Castle Cnty. Sch. Dist., 642 F.2d 687,
698 (3d Cir. 1981) (finding that the parents were forced to engage in buck-passing because the
local district and state agency were pointing to each other to provide the funding needed for
services to the youth and determining that the Developmentally Disabled Act was made to sup-
plement the Education Act and neither removes responsibility of funding from the Education
Act nor confines options for funding).
339. Land, supra note 11, at 281.
340. See STROUL, supra note 27, at 3-4.
341. Ass'N FOR CHILDREN'S MENTAL HEALTH, EVIDENCE BASED PRACTICE BELIEFS, DEFINI-
TION, SUGGESTIONS FOR FAMILIES 4 (2004), available at http://www.acmh-mi.org/41447 ACMH_
Booklet.pdf; see also Mullen, supra note 14, at 205-06 (explaining four selection criteria that
have been used to determine whether a practice is evidence-based, including whether "the treat-
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Wraparound services, multisystemic therapy (MST), functional family
therapy, and therapeutic foster care (also known as "multidimensional
treatment foster care") are examples of evidence-based practices that
could be provided to children through a coordinated system of care.
The intentions of legal regimes that affect children with mental health
disorders can be realized if evidence-based practices are delivered in a
coordinated manner, reflecting system of care principles. For exam-
ple, the integration mandate required under Olmstead to reduce un-
necessary institutionalization of children can be fulfilled if states
develop systems of care for children's mental health that incorporate
the use of evidence-based practices. 342
A. Coordination and Collaboration Among Child-Serving Agencies
Although an individual agency can improve the care and treatment
of youth with mental health disorders, the needs of these children
"cannot be placed at the doorstep of any single agency or system....
[E]ffective solutions require that multiple relevant agencies coordi-
nate and integrate strategies and services." 343 For example, collabora-
tion among agencies "can include coordinated strategic planning,
multiagency budget submissions, implementation of comprehensive
screening and assessment centers, cross-training of staff, and team ap-
proaches to assessment and case management." 344
In order to identify those children in need of evidence-based mental
health services in the community, public agencies should coordinate to
provide mental health screenings to children who are at high risk for
requiring mental health treatment, such as children living in high-
poverty and high-crime neighborhoods, children in special education,
and those who have had some contact with the child welfare or juve-
ment practices had been standardized through manuals or guidelines; the practices had been
evaluated with controlled research designs; through the use of objective measures, important
outcomes were demonstrated; and the research was conducted by different research teams").
342. See BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAw, STILL WAITING, supra note 25, at 2
("The current system is broken in many ways. The continuing failure to provide the community
services envisioned in the Olmstead ruling wastes public resources. Multiple studies of alterna-
tive approaches find that institutional care is more expensive than early and consistent commu-
nity options. ... Systems of care for children reduce inpatient hospital days .... Multisystemic
therapy for high-risk youth saves more than $31,661 in subsequent costs to the criminal justice
system, while multidimensional treatment foster care for troubled youth saves $43.70 in residen-
tial treatment costs for every dollar spent.").
343. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 7.
344. Id. at 8: see also Huang et al., supra note 300, at 622 ("Collaborative efforts to deliver
community-based services and supports, revision of rules that impede service delivery, and align-
ment of financing to support prevention and treatment should be integral aspects of this
effort.").
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nile justice systems. 345 When the screenings flag a potential unmet
need, those children should be assessed more comprehensively for
specific disorders and treatment needs. 346 Public agencies should
communicate about the needs of youth with serious mental health dis-
orders to ensure they are diverted from RTCs and from the juvenile
justice and child welfare systems, whenever possible, and instead pro-
vided with appropriate community-based services. 347 The provision of
community-based treatment is not only immediately less expensive
than more costly interventions like residential treatment, but "[1]ower
recidivism for juvenile offenders, reduced rates of psychiatric hospital-
ization, less need for child welfare intervention, fewer emergency
room visits, fewer disruptive crises in the school," and other long-term
positive effects also result in substantial cost savings. 348
Agencies and courts should hesitate before placing children in
RTCs and should instead coordinate to explore all of the available
community-based treatment options whenever possible. The Ameri-
can Bar Association's Youth at Risk Initiative encourages juvenile
probation officers, attorneys, judges, and other professionals to be vig-
ilant in placing children at RTCs and to engage youth and parents in a
discussion regarding better alternatives. 349 When a child is at risk of
entering residential treatment, different child-serving agencies should
mobilize these various professionals and work together to assess the
child's needs, overcome any eligibility or financial barriers, and de-
liver community-based services immediately to prevent residential
placement. Children who end up incarcerated or in RTCs should re-
ceive effective mental health treatment and monitoring in placement.
Effective planning prior to discharge to arrange for services to be pro-
vided immediately upon return to the community can prevent the cy-
cling of those children back into emergency rooms, psychiatric
345. See Huang et al., supra note 300, at 616 (emphasizing the ineffectiveness of the current
system of treatment for children due to the use of excessively restrictive settings, the lack of
availability of community-based options, and the weakness of the coordination among agencies,
but finding an effective resolution in the use of evidenced-based practices within a system of
care).
346. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 9.
347. Id. at 8-9 (noting that for some youth, "penetration into the juvenile justice system and
placement into juvenile detention and correctional facilities will [only] further increase the num-
ber of mentally ill youth in the Nation's juvenile facilities who are receiving inadequate mental
health services").
348. Weithorn, supra note 36, at 1503; see also WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, WATCH-
ING THE BoTroM LINE: COST-EFFECTIVE INTERVENTIONS FOR REDUCING CRIME IN WASHING-
TON 6 (1998) (estimating that the use of multisystemic therapy could save crime victims about
$13,982 in future out-of-pocket costs).
349. Behar et al., supra note 33, at 411-12.
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hospitalizations, residential treatment placements, and juvenile cor-
rection facilities.350
Public agencies should take steps to meaningfully incorporate the
system of care approach by developing structures and policies for the
early identification of children with mental health disorders, the deliv-
ery of necessary services in the community, and the timely and well-
planned discharge of children who are placed out of the home. The
system of care framework was developed to facilitate such reform in
the children's mental health system35' through meaningful improve-
ment of the delivery of services to children and families across differ-
ent agencies.352 While most states report that they have adopted a
system of care approach, a much smaller number can actually point to
any policies, regulations, laws, or practices that have been developed
to make the system of care operational. 353 Public agencies should im-
plement the system of care approach by developing comprehensive,
community-based systems of supports and services emphasizing indi-
vidualized care, full participation of families, coordination among
child-serving agencies, cultural competence (defined as the ability to
work effectively and sensitively within various cultural contexts), and
the placement of children in the least restrictive environment. 354
These core principles involve the restructuring of local systems and
policies to provide a broad range of treatment services. 355 A system
of care is not a specific service, but rather a holistic, coordinated ap-
proach that a public agency or network of public agencies can use to
allow for all aspects of a child's life to be considered in his treatment,
in contrast to the isolation of individual mental health services and
compartmentalization on the part of public agencies responsible for
the provision of those services.356 Systems of care incorporate a wide
range of services that emphasize the importance of early identification
and intervention, as well as partnerships with youth and their fami-
lies.35 7 Families receive all of the necessary treatments to serve the
350. See, e.g., SEDLAK & MCPHERSON, supra note 247, at 8-9 (noting that one-third of
juveniles in residential treatment have no idea what will happen when they leave the facility).
351. STROUL, supra note 27, at 1.
352. See STROUL, supra note 27, at 1; see also Huang et al., supra note 300, at 616.
353. COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 6.
354. BETH A. STROUL ET AL., UPDATING THE SYSTEM OF CARE CONCEPT AND PHILOSOPHY 1
(2010).
355. Id. at 7.
356. Id. at 5 ("[The system of care concept] is not intended to refer to a single 'program' that
operates according to this philosophy, but rather to a coordinated network of services and sup-
ports across agencies to meet the multiple and complex needs of any given population."); see
also Clay, supra note 329.
357. STROUL ET AL., supra note 354, at 4.
1112 [Vol. 61:1049
THERE'S NO PLACE LIKE HOME
multiple needs and problems that are occurring simultaneously within
the family unit, such as counseling, educational services, and sub-
stance abuse services.358 Within a system of care, families and chil-
dren receive services from relevant agencies in a cohesive manner,
and intervention occurs on various different levels.3 59
The holistic approach and complexity creates difficulties in assess-
ing the effectiveness of systems of care through research. Because no
uniform system exists and because this approach is constantly evolv-
ing, there are limitations on the assessment of positive outcomes. Fur-
thermore, most studies have not been performed with control groups
to compare systematic results,360 but the existing research has demon-
strated promising reductions in residential treatments and out-of-
home placements generally, as well as increased parent satisfaction
with the accessibility of services. 361 The public agencies charged with
serving Mary could have achieved her stability and maintained her
placement in the community if they had collaborated through a sys-
tem of care approach that both reflected cultural competency to ad-
dress issues of stigma and involved coordinated identification of the
range of services necessary to address her intensive needs.
B. Use of Evidence-Based Practices in Mental Health Treatment
Recent research has shown that the use of evidence-based practices
delivered within a system of care significantly improves outcome re-
sults. 362 While the system of care provides a coordinated approach to
service delivery, effective services themselves must be available in the
form of evidence-based practices. By delivering evidence-based prac-
tices through a systems of care approach, public agencies can ensure
that each child has an effective treatment plan that is individualized to
358. See id. at 3 fig.1; see also Huang et al., supra note 300, at 623 (emphasizing the need for
the implementation of preventative measures and early intervention).
359. STROUL, supra note 27, at 7. Moreover, because systems of care treat a range of issues,
the concept is flexible and uses existing services, as well as evidence-based practices to effec-
tively serve the various needs of children. Id. Even though the core concepts are the same,
systems of care generally vary across the country, as they have been adapted by particular public
agencies in some states to address the needs of their individual communities. Id. at 7-8. Systems
of care do not produce identical policies or methodologies, but instead reflect a "cluster of orga-
nizational change strategies that are based on a set of values and principles that are intended to
shape policies, regulations, funding mechanisms, services and supports." Id. at 6-9.
360. See MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 168-69.
361. Id. at 191-93.
362. See ROBERT M. FRIEDMAN & DAVID A. DREWS, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES, SYSTEMS
OF CARE, & INDIVIDUALIZED CARE 6-7 (2005), available at http://rtckids.fmhi.usf.edu/rtcpubs/
EBP.friedmandrews.pdf.
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the goals and values of his family.363 Despite the proven effectiveness
of evidence-based practices, as of 2008 only twelve states mandated
the use of such practices for children and only eight of those actually
promoted, supported, or required them statewide. 364 Evidenced-
based practices should be mandated and implemented across all states
through a system of care philosophy, because such a coordinated ap-
proach can be used to effectively overcome stigma, fragmentation of
services and persistence of unavailable services to better serve chil-
dren within the mental health system.365 Through these evidence-
based practices, which are culturally competent and community-
based, such barriers can be eliminated and the ultimate goals of Olm-
stead and the relevant federal legal regimes can be achieved.
1. Wraparound Programs
Reflecting the principles of the system of care approach, wrap-
around treatment is a family-driven program that addresses the vari-
ous needs of children involved in multiple systems who are at risk for
out-of-home placement. 366 The wraparound philosophy focuses on
the creation of a definable plan that is comprehensive, holistic, and
individualized for each child and family.367 The program essentially
"wraps" the child and family with services in a manner that allows for
cross-system collaboration and blending of funds from various agen-
cies to create more flexibility in treatment. 368 A child's services can
be funded from multiple agencies, such as through local child welfare
and juvenile justice agency funds, as well as Medicaid dollars,369 rather
than requiring the child and family to navigate individual, compart-
mentalized systems to receive services. A six-year follow-up study of
363. Id. at 10. But see COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 6 (noting that while fifty states report
they have incorporated a system of care philosophy, only eighteen states can actually point to
specific steps to make a system of care operational or embed those principles in regulatory and
legislative structures).
364. COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 7.
365. See Huang et al., supra note 300, at 620-21 (highlighting the need for "culturally based
interventions and alternative care" to reduce barriers, such as stigma, lack of availability, and
fragmentation of services, that deter communities of color from receiving necessary services).
366. ERIC BRUNS & JESSE C. SUTER, SUMMARY OF THE WRAPAROUND EVIDENCE BASE:
APRIL 2010 UPDATE 1 (2010), available at http://www.nwi.pdx.edu/publications.shtml; see also
STACEY M. CORNETT, HOME-BASED SERVICES FOR HIGH-RISK YOUTH: ASSESSMENT, WRAP-
AROUND PLANNING AND SERVICE DELIVERY 3-3 (2011).
367. STROUL, supra note 27, at 7; see also BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra
note 23, at 35 (discussing the several components of wraparound services, including multidiscipli-
nary team meetings, coordinating formal and informal services, implementing an individualized
plan, and monitoring specific outcomes).
368. Leviton, supra note 20, at 33.
369. See Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 18.
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a coordinated case-management program using the wraparound ap-
proach, called Child and Youth Intensive Case Management (CY-
ICM), found that New York saved almost $8,000,000 when hospital
admissions significantly declined after clients enrolled in CYICM.3 70
This study demonstrates that wraparound is not only effective in re-
ducing negative outcomes, but also in reducing state costs in support-
ing youth and families.
Families receiving wraparound services engage in a team-driven and
family-centered program that builds on their strengths as a family.371
Unlike other services, which are professionally driven and deficit-
based, wraparound is an "on the ground" system that is guided by
specialized planning to ensure a core system of family values.372
Wraparound programs aim to allow a youth at-risk of residential
treatment to instead receive the services that she requires at home and
in the community.373 These programs often provide services for about
thirty to ninety days,374 but can last longer. A care coordinator is as-
signed to a family and is responsible for creating a treatment plan for
the child and family that incorporates multiple systems.375 The care
coordinator then works with a team consisting of family members, ser-
vice providers, and community members to ensure the child is receiv-
ing the necessary services at home, school, and within the
community. 376 Wraparound programs are systematic and outcome
based,377 and families help develop clearly defined goals and perform-
ance measures throughout their engagement in wraparound.378
The Wraparound Milwaukee program is well known as a model of
an effective alternative approach to residential treatment and psychi-
atric hospitalization for children. A collaborative county-operated or-
ganization provides comprehensive care to youth referred by the child
370. Mary E. Evans et al., Child, Family, and System Outcomes of Intensive Case Management
in New York State, 67 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 273, 280 (1996).
371. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9; see also Bruce Kamradt, Wraparound
Milwaukee: Aiding Youth with Mental Health Needs, 7 Juv. JUsT. 14, 15 (2000) (describing wrap-
around as a "[s]trength-based approach to children and families").
372. BRUNS & SUTER, supra note 366, at 1.
373. Leviton, supra note 20, at 33.
374. LYNNE MARSENICH, EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICES IN MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR
FOSTER YOUTH 35 (2002).
375. OJJDP, Model Programs Guide: Wraparound/Case Management, available at http://www.
ojjdp.gov/mpglprogramTypesDescriptions.aspx.
376. Id.
377. Id.; see also CORNETr, supra note 366, at 3-9.
378. OJJDP, supra note 375; see also Kamradt, supra note 371, at 16 (explaining wraparound




welfare and juvenile justice systems.379 Studies of the Milwaukee pro-
gram report a 60% reduction in recidivism and residential treat-
ment,380 and an 80% reduction in hospitalization.381
The Fostering Individualized Assistance Program (FIAP), devel-
oped at the University of Southern Florida, has also achieved positive
results by providing wraparound services and supports for children
and their families to help develop greater permanency in foster place-
ments and reinforce natural family supports.38 2 A random-assignment
study compared children receiving standard services to children re-
ceiving FIAP services and found that children involved with FIAP
were significantly less likely to change placements, boys were less
likely to be delinquent or externalize behaviors, and children who had
a history of incarceration or running away were less likely than chil-
dren receiving standard services to repeat these behaviors. 83 Addi-
tionally, in Ohio, several state agencies contribute to a program called
the Linkages Project, which supports the collaboration of local agen-
cies in providing services to youth to facilitate a reduction in crime
and improvement in mental health services. 384 Similar home-based
family intervention programs in Washington and Maine have also
been shown to effectively reduce the possibility of future out-of-home
placement.385
As of 2002, various studies demonstrated that wraparound pro-
grams were effective in decreasing the cost of care, rates of delin-
quency, and placement in restrictive settings, as well as improving
social and community functioning.386 In 2009, a meta-analytic review
of the seven controlled studies on wraparound treatment revealed sig-
nificant results for outcome assessments, including improvements in
"youth behavior, youth functioning, and youth community adjust-
379. See Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 8.
380. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9.
381. COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS.,
supra note 42, at 19; see also OJJDP, supra note 375; MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40,
at 9.
382. Marsenich, supra note 374, at 33.
383. Id. at 35; see also MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note
15, at 174.
384. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 8.
385. Edward C. Hinckley & W. Frank Ellis, An Effective Alternative to Residential Placement:
Home-Based Services, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 209 (1985); see also BRUNS & SUTER,
supra note 366, at 5 (referencing a study in Washington comparing youth in the Connections
program to youth receiving mental health services for less than a two-year period that demon-
strated youth in Connections were significantly less likely to recidivate and functioned substan-
tially better at home, school, and in the community).
386. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9.
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ment."3 87 Many children with unmet mental health needs are in-
volved in a variety of systems, such as the child welfare, juvenile
justice, Medicaid, and special education systems. Wraparound yields
positive outcomes because it requires coordination of these systems
(just as the federal legal regimes described herein require coordina-
tion), employing mechanisms that take into account the complexity
and overlapping needs of families and children involved in multiple
systems.388 This approach can also help to reduce stigma and ensure
long-term results through family engagement and an emphasis on
problem solving, teamwork, hope, and social support.389
Participation on Mary's part in a wraparound program could have
brought key professionals from all of the agencies that affected Mary's
life to the table to develop an effective plan for her treatment. A
wraparound caseworker could have managed her treatment by secur-
ing the input and involvement of the necessary stakeholders in her
service delivery. In allowing for blended funding streams, any finan-
cial barriers to the provision of community-based mental health ser-
vices, such as the counseling that her pediatrician recommended,
could have been removed. By giving both Mary and her foster mother
an opportunity to discuss their values and goals, the team's develop-
ment of a wraparound program could have been responsive to her
foster mother's concerns regarding stigma and could have been indi-
vidualized to fit Mary's unique needs as a child in foster care, a victim
of rape, and a student with learning and emotional disabilities.
2. Multisystemic Therapy
Multisystemic therapy is one of the most researched evidence-based
practices for troubled youth and their families.390 Youth who partici-
pate in MST receive intensive, short-term, in-home treatment with
their families.39 1 MST aims to improve the family's ability to over-
come risk factors that lead to delinquency and helps reinforce protec-
tive factors.392 It also tries to enhance monitoring techniques used by
387. BRUNS & SUTER, supra note 366, at 2. However, more research is needed to expand
upon the existing studies and examine the contexts in which wraparound is most effective.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Johanna K. P. Greeson et al., Contributions of Therapist Characteristics and Stability to
Intensive In-Home Therapy Youth Outcomes, 19 RESEARCH ON Soc. WORK PRAC. 239, 240
(2009).
391. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 175; see also
COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 44 ("The treatment is delivered in natural settings and is
designed in collaboration with family members.").
392. Judy L. Estren & Kristin Winokur, Community-Based Solutions for Delinquent Youth: A
Guide for Advocates, 29 A.B.A. CHILD L. PRAc. 49, 57 (2010).
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parents and replace negative relationships with positive social rela-
tionships.393 The home setting is used to foster a healthier environ-
ment in which the family feels empowered and capable. 394 The
program reflects the importance of coordination among various agen-
cies through direct intervention in multiple facets of a youth's life, in-
cluding family, school, and peer relationships, and gives youth and
families the tools needed to resolve common problematic situa-
tions.395 MST is an example of a service that could make up one com-
ponent of a wraparound program.
Typically, MST programs involve home-based services that last ap-
proximately four months.3 9 6 MST therapists must have a high level of
clinical training and receive intensive supervision, which distinguishes
MST from other alternative services. 397 During the three to five
months of treatment, MST teams provide consistent therapy and assis-
tance to the family, which usually involves multiple contacts through-
out the week. 3 9 8 Because caseloads are usually very low, ranging from
four to six families, MST teams are available twenty-fours a day to
address family needs,399 allowing for intervention short of hospitaliza-
tion or residential treatment when a child is escalating towards a crisis.
Therapists focus on identifying family strengths and developing
healthy support systems,4 0 0 and addressing various risk factors that
disrupt the family dynamic, such as parental substance abuse.401 Fur-
thermore, therapists use empirically supported therapies, like prag-
matic family and cognitive behavioral therapies, to advance family
functioning and cohesion.402
393. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, MULTISYSTEMIC THERAPY OUTCOMES IN AN
EVIDENCE-BASED PRACTICE PILOT 2 (2011), available at www.wsipp.wa.gov/rptfiles/11-04-3901.
pdf; see also COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
SERVS., supra note 42, at 18 ("MST is designed to increase family functioning through improved
parental monitoring of children, reduction of familial conflict, improved communication, and
related factors. Additionally, MST interventions focus on increasing the youth's interaction with
'prosocial' peers and reducing association with 'deviant' peers, primarily through parental
mediation.").
394. Multisystemic Therapy (MST) for Juvenile Offenders, NREPP (2007), http://nrepp.
samhsa.gov/ViewIntervention.aspx?id=26 [hereinafter National Registry].
395. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 175-76; see
also Leviton, supra note 20, at 32.
396. National Registry, supra note 394.
397. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 176.
398. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9.
399. Id.; Estren & Winokur, supra note 392, at 57.
400. Model Programs Guide. Multisystemic Therapy (MST), OJJDP, http://www.ojjdp.gov/
mpg/mpgProgramDetails.aspx (last visited Jan. 25, 2011).
401. Id.
402. National Registry, supra note 394.
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In a recent study published by the Washington State Institute for
Public Policy in April 2011, 215 youth who enrolled in MST in 2007
were examined on the basis of various characteristics and outcomes. 403
The population included youth between the ages of twelve and seven-
teen who were exhibiting behavioral issues, were at high risk for out-
of-home placement, and had an available family support structure.404
All youth and families were referred by the mental health, juvenile
justice, child welfare, or education systems.405 Youth who received
MST were compared to youth in analogous circumstances in the
mental health system. 406 Although the results were not statistically
significant, youth receiving MST were less likely to be involved in any
crimes after a twelve-month period.407 Furthermore, youth involved
in MST had significantly higher rates of utilization of mental health
services during the following year.408
The Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration's
(SAMHSA) National Registry of Evidence-Based Programs and Prac-
tices also examined the statistical effectiveness of MST through sev-
eral different studies that evaluated post-treatment arrests, long-term
arrests, long-term incarceration rates, self-reported criminal activity,
alcohol and drug use, perceived family functioning and cohesion, and
peer aggression.409 Overall, youth involved in MST recidivated 42%
of the time, in contrast with the 62% recidivism rate for youth receiv-
ing other typical services. 410 Over a four-year period, only 22% of
MST-involved youth recidivated, compared with 71% of youth who
completed another service. 411 Furthermore, approximately 13 years
later, youth who had completed MST treatment had significantly
lower rates of recidivism and improved family cohesion in relation to
comparable youth who participated only in more standard treatment
programs, such as individual therapy.412 In addition to positive out-
comes associated with recidivism, psychiatric symptomatology, and re-
403. WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, supra note 393, at 1.
404. Id. at 2.
405. Id.
406. Id. at 4.
407. Id. at 4 & exhibit 5.
408. Id. at 6.
409. National Registry, supra note 394. Each study was an experimental study with a control
group. For example, one long-term study compared youth who received MST to youth who only
received individual therapy over a thirteen-year period in Baltimore, Maryland.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id.; see also OJJDP, supra note 4 (describing a 1992 study in South Carolina comparing
outcomes for juvenile offenders receiving MST to outcomes for those receiving only typical
treatment revealed that family cohesion was significantly higher with families receiving MST).
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duced drug use, MST also serves as a cost-effective clinical alternative
to residential placement. 413
Although more research is needed to assess the effectiveness of
MST on specific populations, the initial results are promising in com-
parison to more restrictive treatments like psychiatric hospitalization
and residential treatment. 414 By maintaining family contact and a sta-
ble environment with accessible services, youth and families are given
the tools to develop social skills to build healthier relationships and
avoid risk factors.
MST could have supported Mary and her foster mother in a very
intensive program with multiple meetings per week, ensuring that
Mary did not experience an emotional crisis without immediate inter-
vention from a highly trained mental health professional. This treat-
ment would have addressed Mary's social, emotional, and behavioral
challenges in her home, school, and community and addressed her
problems holistically to allow her to learn positive behaviors and ap-
propriate social skills in those settings.
3. Functional Family Therapy
Functional family therapy (FFT) is a program for at-risk youth that
focuses on developing protective factors and assisting the family in
reducing risk factors.415 This research-based program targets youth
who are already exhibiting delinquent behaviors, violence, substance
abuse, or emotional disorders.416 FFT developed out of the need to
serve an at-risk population of adolescents and families who were ne-
glected and did not have the resources to gain treatment.417 Because
many families entered into the system angry and frustrated, FFT was
created to facilitate treatment for underserved populations, as well as
provide culturally competent treatments to discouraged families.418
This treatment primarily focuses on developing family alliances, com-
413. Cocozza & Skowyra, supra note 211, at 10; see also WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y,
supra note 393, at 6; WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POL'Y, supra note 348, at 1 (noting that MST
is also very cost-efficient, saving taxpayers a net gain of $7,881 for every high-risk juvenile in the
program).
414. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 176.
415. Estren & Winokur, Community-Based Solutions, supra note 392, at 57.
416. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9.
417. JAMES ALEXANDER ET AL., FUNCTIONAL FAMILY THERAPY: BLUEPRINTS FOR VIOLENCE
PREVENTION, BOOK THREE (1998), available at http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blueprints/model
programs/FFT.html.
418. Id.; see also COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE
SERvs., supra note 42, at 18 ("The treatment model is deliberately respectful of individual differ-
ences, cultures and ethnicities and aims for obtainable change with specific and individualized
intervention that focuses on risk and protective factors.").
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munication skills, problem solving, and parenting skills to reduce be-
havioral problems.419
FFT is a short-term, outcome-driven intervention targeting youth
aged 11-18.420 Participating families typically receive 8-12 one-hour
sessions for approximately 90 days,421 while more severe cases might
require 26-30 hours of direct services to the family unit.422 FFT ses-
sions are usually administered in either a community or home-based
setting to reinforce the importance of the family in the youth's treat-
ment.423 Similar to other multifaceted programs, FFT uses a wide-
range of professionals to serve the family throughout the program,
such as mental health professionals, mental health technicians, and
probation officers.424
FFT uses a phased program to accomplish its goals. 4 2 5 Although all
FFT programs are individualized based on the family unit, each family
plan uses a build-up program to accomplish specific goals.426 In the
engagement phase, the therapist concentrates on creating a trusting
environment and emphasizes the factors that will help the family com-
plete the plan.42 7 Subsequently, the motivation phase focuses on
changing maladaptive behaviors and reinforcing motivation and
faith.428 Thereafter, the assessment phase clarifies the function of
interpersonal relationships within the families and focuses on how the
relationships can influence changes in behavior.429 During the next
step, individualized techniques are developed to promote appropriate
behaviors.430 In the last phase, the case management explores com-
munity restraints and resources that may either help or hinder the
family's functional needs.431 Although the phases are separate, they
419. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 9; see also COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OF-
FICE OF MENTAL HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., supra note 42, at 18 (2008) ("FFT
targets multiple areas of family functioning and ecology for change and features well developed
protocols for training, implementation . . . , and quality assurance and improvement.").
420. Functional Family Therapy, OJJDP, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/mpgProgramDetails.aspx
(last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
421. Id.
422. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 417.
423. Functional Family Therapy, supra note 420.
424. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 417.
425. Functional Family Therapy, supra note 420.
426. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 417; see also COOPER ET AL., supra note 13, at 44 ("The
FFT clinical model organizes the intervention around specific phases.").
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build on one another, creating reassessment throughout the entire
process. 432
Since 1969, several studies have been conducted on the effective-
ness of FFT'.4 3 3 Multiple studies have shown that in comparison to
standard juvenile probation services, residential facilities, and other
approaches, FFT reduces re-arrests up to 60% more effectively and
significantly reduces recidivism and the cost of treatment. 434 In 2009,
a meta-analytic study of Washington State's evidence-based programs
showed that FFT can reduce a youth's chance of recidivism by
18.1%.435 Furthermore, a 13-year follow-up revealed that children
who did not participate in FFT had a 70% chance of recidivating, in
contrast with those who received FFT, who only had a 57% chance of
recidivating. 436 FFT has also proven to be very successful in reducing
violence, drug abuse, conduct disorder, and family conflicts, as well as
the number of youth in out-of-home placements and juvenile deten-
tion.4 3 7 As one of the oldest forms of alternative treatment, FFT has
evolved into an effective treatment that should be used to help stabi-
lize children with mental health disorders and their families, and to
prevent more costly outcomes.
FFT could have provided Mary and her foster mother with an op-
portunity to learn communication strategies in an individualized pro-
gram. Mary could have developed appropriate behaviors and
effective coping strategies with the support of a trained professional in
a structured program, rather than expressing anger and frustration in
unsafe ways.
4. Therapeutic Foster Care
Therapeutic foster care (TFC), also known as multidimensional
treatment foster care, is another alternative to residential treatment
and detention for children with mental health problems. 4 3 8 While the
federal legal regimes described herein favor maintenance of the family
432. Id.
433. ALEXANDER ET AL., supra note 417.
434. Functional Family Therapy, supra note 420.
435. ELIZABETH K. DRAKE ET AL., EVIDENCE-BASED PUBLIC POLICY OrrIoNs To REDUCE
CRIME AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE COSTS: IMPLICATIONS IN WASHINGTON STATE 191 (2009), availa-
ble at http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/pub.asp?docid=09-00-1201; see also THOMAS L. SEXTON & JAMES
F. ALEXANDER, OJJDP, Functional Family Therapy 1, 6 (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffilesl/ojjdp/184743.pdf ("Of those who completed [FFT], only 19.8 percent committed an
offense during the year following completion, compared with 36 percent of the treatment-as-
usual comparison group.").
436. DRAKE ET AL., supra note 435, at 191.
437. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 10.
438. Estren & Winokur, Community-Based Solutions, supra note 392, at 57.
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unit and intend for children to remain in their homes whenever possi-
ble, some children, such as those who would be unsafe there as a re-
sult of abuse or neglect by a parent, must be removed from their
homes. For those who require an out-of-home placement, TFC may
be the least restrictive alternative for children who have an emotional
disturbance or delinquency system involvement.439 The goal of TFC
programs is to place high-risk children in therapeutic settings that
mimic a nurturing home.440 These programs reflect the preference of
the child welfare legal regime for children to be placed in family-like
settings, rather than congregate care settings.
Although there are several types of TFC, all programs share similar
core qualities, 441 using specially trained foster parents as the primary
intervention. 4 4 2 Children are usually placed in TFC for about six to
nine months, and the TFC parents join a group of professionals who
engage in a collaborative individualized plan for the juvenile. 4 4 3
Throughout the placement, children and TFC parents receive consis-
tent support from clinicians and other mental health professionals. 4 4 4
The families are provided with counseling every week and receive
daily contact regarding the child's progress.4 4 5 An individualized plan
allows each youth and family to have clear expectations throughout
the program.4 4 6 Additionally, the biological family is involved in the
therapeutic treatments. 447 Biological parents are given parent training
and family counseling to help prepare them for the child's return
home. 4 4 8 Furthermore, TFC is a highly structured program that pro-
vides consistent monitoring of the child to ensure that the child does
439. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 176.
440. Id.; see also Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC), NREPP (2009), http://
nrepp.samhsa.gov/Viewlntervention.aspx?id=48 ("Youths are individually placed with highly
trained and supervised foster parents and are provided with intensive support and treatment in a
setting that closely mirrors normative life.").
441. MENTAL HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL, supra note 15, at 176.
442. MARSENICH, supra note 374, at 36.
443. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, OJJDP, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/mpgProgram
Details.aspxManagement (last visited Jan. 25, 2012).
444. MARSENICH, supra note 374, at 36; see also COMMONWEALTH OF PA. OFFICE OF MENTAL
HEALTH & SUBSTANCE ABUSE SERVS., supra note 42, at 19 (2008) ("Intervention is multifaceted
and occurs in multiple settings.").
445. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, supra note 443; see also PATRICIA CHAMBER-
LAIN & SHARON F. MIHALIC, MULTIDIMENSIONAL TREATMENT FOSTER CARE: BLUEPRINTS FOR
VIOLENCE PREVENTION, BOOK EIGHT (1998), available at http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/blue
prints/modelprograms/MTFC.html.
446. CHAMBERLAIN & MIHALIC, supra note 445; see also Multidimensional Treatment Foster
Care (MTFC), supra note 440 (noting that youth are provided with a daily structure throughout
the program that encompasses clear limits and expectations).
447. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, supra note 443.
448. See id.
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not interact with negative influences and that she instead begins par-
ticipating in pro-social activities.449 Youth are also provided with skill
training, school-based intervention, and academic support.450
A study performed by the Oregon Social Learning Center focused
on three different populations of youth: (1) chronic delinquents re-
ferred by the juvenile justice system; (2) severely emotionally dis-
turbed youth referred by the mental health department; and (3)
children with behavioral problems in the child welfare system.4 5 1 TFC
was initiated in response to the overwhelming evidence that parent-
management training contributed to significant successes in improving
problem behaviors.452 Results from studies conducted by the National
Institute of Mental Health reveal that TFC significantly reduced crime
rates for boys a year after completion, in comparison to boys in group
homes. 453 After two years, boys were more likely to have legitimate
jobs, to not use drugs, to have positive relationships with their parents,
and to not have engaged in unprotected sex. 454 Studies of TFC also
show that the program facilitated better school attendance and home-
work completion. 4 5 5 Additionally, youth were more likely to spend
fewer days in incarceration and were placed in community placements
faster than youth in more restrictive settings. 456
A Surgeon General's report from 1999 also indicated that TFC led
to better outcomes at lower costs than more restrictive placements. 457
According to the report, TFC lowered the percentage of youth re-
institutionalized and reduced the number of criminal referrals, run-
aways, and detained youth, in comparison to those placed in group
care.458 Various controlled studies reveal that youth who participated
in TFC "made significant improvements in adjustment, self-esteem,
sense of identity, and aggressive behavior." 459 Seventy percent of
youth in TFC remained in less restrictive environments for a signifi-
cant amount of time after their treatment. 460 Similar to other alterna-
tive placements, more controlled studies are needed to help
449. See CHAMBERLAIN & MIHALIC, supra note 445.
450. Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care, supra note 443.
451. MARSENICH, supra note 374, at 35.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 36.
454. Id.
455. MAGELLAN HEALTH SERVS., supra note 40, at 8.
456. Id.; see also Multidimensional Treatment Foster Care (MTFC), supra note 440 (all three
studies referenced involved randomized youth and control groups).
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distinguish exactly which aspects of TFC benefit youth. However,
there is substantial evidence that TFC can effectively help youth who
need to leave their homes, without completely removing them from
the community.
TFC could have helped Mary and her foster mother to maintain
their family unit. With appropriate parent management training,
Mary's foster mother could have learned about Mary's disabilities and
needs, and developed strategies for effectively addressing her emo-
tional and behavioral problems. Weekly counseling could have
helped Mary and her foster mother process their emotions with a
trained professional.
VI. CONCLUSION
Inadequacies in the community mental health system have led to
the unnecessary institutionalization of children in RTCs.461 With
growing numbers of children living in poverty in the United States 462
and the higher likelihood that poor children will develop mental
health disorders, 463 it is more important than ever that the intentions
of federal legal regimes related to child welfare, special education,
health care, juvenile justice, and disability rights be fulfilled. Through
statutes, regulations, case law, and policies, these federal regimes are
explicitly structured to ensure that children from low-income families
are provided with mental health and educational services in their com-
munities in a timely manner. However, the reality for these children
does not reflect the goals of the law as written, and children from low-
income families continue to experience unwarranted institutionaliza-
tion. With states paying as much as seven hundred dollars per day to
institutionalize children with emotional and behavioral disorders in
RTCs, youth are leaving these facilities only to cycle back into resi-
dential treatment, psychiatric hospitalization, and juvenile detention
facilities without achieving stability or mental health.464
Instead, they are likely to become "disconnected youth," young
adults without any meaningful connection to education or employ-
461. Cichon, supra note 47, at 12.
462. U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United
States: 2010 (Sept. 13, 2011), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/in-
come-wealth/cbll-157.html (announcing data showing that the poverty rate increased for chil-
dren under eighteen in the United States from 20.7% in 2009 to 22.0% in 2010).
463. MENTAL HEALTH: A NATIONAL AciON AGENDA, supra note 1, at 129; see also
HOWELL, supra note 276, at 1.
464. BAZELON CTR. FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, supra note 35.
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ment.465 As these disconnected youth become impoverished young
adults, the broken children's mental health system only serves to fur-
ther the structural poverty that initially led these children to need-
and then go without-necessary mental health treatment. This cycle
of crisis and disconnectedness stems from the stigma attached to
mental illness, the scarcity of services and delays families experience
in securing needed services, and the compartmentalization and frag-
mentation within the children's mental health system.
Policymakers, public agencies, judges, and attorneys need to be edu-
cated about the overuse of RTCs, the ineffectiveness of treatment for
children in these "total institutions," the risks of abuse, isolation,
overmedication, and physical restraints, and the high costs to taxpay-
ers. Training for all of these stakeholders should also include a discus-
sion of the strong and common mandates of legal regimes related to
child welfare, special education, health care, juvenile justice, and disa-
bility rights that children receive preventive, community-based treat-
ment, rather than back-end intervention in the form of
institutionalization. 466
Diversion from institutional settings alone will not suffice; evidence-
based treatment practices delivered through a coordinated system of
care approach is necessary for children to achieve mental health.
Stakeholders at all levels can prevent the disconnectedness that these
youth are likely to experience without early intervention through co-
ordination with each other and with recognition of the robust ways
that the law "on the books" requires this holistic approach. The dis-
junction between the reality for children living in poverty and the aims
of several legal regimes for the provision of early, preventive
community-based treatment for children can be overcome through the
use of proven treatments grounded in research regarding best prac-
tices in children's mental health care. The meaningful incorporation
of a system of care approach into the policies and practices of local
and state agencies and the use of proven evidence-based practices will
465. See MICHAEL WALD & TIA MARTINEZ, CONNECTED BY 25: IMPROVING THE LIFE
CHANCES OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST VULNERABLE 14-24 YEAR OLDS (2003), available at http://
www.hewlett.org/uploads/files/ConnectedBy25.pdf.
466. With law faculty from the Georgetown University Law Center and the University of the
District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law, as well as local legal services attorneys, the
author has developed and implemented trainings and materials to educate court-appointed at-
torneys in the Family Court of the District of Columbia Superior Court about the concerns
related to institutionalization of children in RTCs and the relevant Medicaid, special education,
and local juvenile delinquency statutes that attorneys can use to advocate for community-based
services and placements for their clients.
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allow for the realization of the goals of these legal regimes and for
true stability, mental health, and inclusion for children with mental
health disorders. 467
467. See, e.g., Complaint, H.B. v. Emkes, No. 3:11-cv-00663 (M.D. Tenn. July 11, 2011) (re-
questing that the court order the state to keep the plaintiffs with their families in "an integrated,
non-segregated setting that can be reasonably accommodated" because the plaintiffs are "capa-
ble of safely living at home with their families with necessary services" and are "being forced to
enter segregated residential settings [but] are qualified to participate in more integrated commu-
nity programs that meet their needs").
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